



**NAVIGATING DEMOGRAPHIC FLOWS:
POPULATIONS, POWER, AND POLICY**

THEME PAPER

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Introduction

A nation's power arises ultimately from its people. Since, all else being equal, more populous nations do not generally fear less populous nations and more productive peoples do not generally fear less productive peoples, systems of international relations, both ancient and modern, have favored nations that are simultaneously populous and productive. At present, the most populous and productive of Europe's offshoots watches warily as the most populous nations of Asia grow increasingly productive. It is against this backdrop that demography, the scientific study of populations, has come to figure prominently in estimations of national power.

When Thomas Malthus argued in 1798 that populations increase until wages approach subsistence and disease and famine check further growth, he accurately described the eighteenth and every preceding century.¹ But all of that changed shortly after Malthus's great work appeared. As the first fruits of what Francis Bacon had called the "conquest of nature" came to be commonly distributed, the human population skyrocketed. In 1800 about a billion humans lived; today, some seven billion do. This exception to Malthus's rule has been dramatic and enduring. It may also prove temporary, if the population at some point exceeds what nature can bear.² But at present it seems increasingly likely that humans will prove as effective at limiting their own numbers as nature ever was. In eighty-four nations fertility has declined below the "replacement rate" of 2.1 children per woman.³ Depopulation has already occurred in thirty-four nations, and, according to UN projections, it will become an increasingly global phenomenon as the twenty-first century progresses.⁴ While this trend can alleviate resource competition and climate change, it carries with it challenges all its own.

Foremost among these is the challenge of providing for dependents. In agricultural societies, children regularly work and the elderly hardly retire, so that individuals who survive childbirth need not anticipate a long period of dependency. Industrial and post-industrial societies, by contrast, devote an increasingly greater amount of resources to both the development of "human capital" via education and the prolongation of life itself. An individual born in an economically advanced country today can expect to pass nearly half of his or her life in dependency.⁵ As the number of dependents exceeds the number of workers, the challenge of

¹ T.R Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 [1798]).

² A number of present day neo-Malthusians warn that for all of mankind's progress, nature holds in reserve its traditional defenses – disease and resource scarcity, both augmented by climate change. See in particular Jared Diamond, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* (New York: Penguin, 2005). For the previous generation's reinvention of Malthus, see Paul Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb* (Sierra Club-Ballantine Books, 1968), and Paul Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich, "The Population Bomb Revisited," *The Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development* 1:3 (2009).

³ This and all subsequent demographic data are derived, unless otherwise noted, from the United Nations, *World Population Prospects, the 2012 Revision*, <http://esa.un.org/wpp/>.

⁴ The UN predicts that global population growth, currently at 1.2%, will slow to .5% in 2050 and .1% in 2100.

⁵ It is difficult to obtain data on average age of entry into the workforce in OECD countries; twenty is a not-bad guess used by some economists (see for instance Heinrich Hock and David Weil, "Modeling the Effects of Population Aging on Consumption in the Presence of Intergenerational Transfers," in *Population Aging*,

providing for them becomes increasingly daunting, particularly in the face of an economic downturn.

This challenge – like so many demographic dilemmas – is as much a political as an economic problem. No democracy restricts the voting rights of the elderly, whereas every democracy restricts the voting rights of the young.⁶ As a result, even in nations with compulsory voting, the median age of the electorate is higher than the median age of the population; in nearly all nations with non-compulsory voting, the elderly participate in elections at far higher rates than the young.⁷ As populations age democracy shades into gerontocracy. A nation's demographic profile can doom attempts to reform state support for elderly dependents, while making it politically attractive to shrink state support for the non-voting young. Which advanced democracies have the political capacity to recast social entitlements? Many developing, democratizing countries face the opposite problem: demographic “bulges” of politically active and economically disadvantaged youth. Which can succeed in incorporating these groups into (often fragile) political systems?

Intergenerational Transfers, and the Macroeconomy, eds. Robert Clark, Naohiro Ogawa, and Andrew Mason (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007) p. 113). The OECD average age of effective retirement for men was 64 and for women 63 in 2011; life expectancy at birth was 80 years in 2013. For data on retirement age, see OECD, “Statistics on Average Effective Age and Official Age of Retirement in OECD Countries,” <http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/ageingandemploymentpolicies-statisticsonaverageeffectiveageofretirement.htm>; for data on life expectancy, see OECD, *OECD Factbook 2013: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics* (OECD Publishing, 2013).

⁶ Indeed, not only advanced democracies but all nations that hold elections leave elderly voting unrestricted. Note, however, that in four Latin American countries with universal compulsory voting, the elderly, while *allowed* are not *compelled* to vote: in Ecuador, citizens over 65 are not compelled to vote; in Argentina and Peru the cutoff is 70 years; in Paraguay it is 75. The one state in which voting is restricted above a certain age is Vatican City: cardinals over 80 are not permitted to participate in papal elections.

Internationally, the most common minimum age of enfranchisement is 18 years, as in the United States. However, four nations allow 17 year-olds to vote and eight nations (including Austria, as of 2007) allow 16 year-olds to vote. Data on international voting laws can be found in the CIA's *World Factbook* under the heading “suffrage”; available on-line: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2123.html>.

⁷ Across OECD states, the voting rate of individuals over 55 years old is ten percent higher than individuals between 16 and 35 years old. In Great Britain, the gap is over 35 percent; only in Australia, Belgium, and Italy do the young participate at higher rates than the old. For data, see OECD, “Society at a Glance 2011: OECD Social Indicators,” available on-line: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/soc_glance-2011-en/08/04/index.html?contentType=&itemId=/content/chapter/soc_glance-2011-29-en&containerItemId=/content/serial/19991290&accessItemIds=/content/book/soc_glance-2011-en&mimeType=text/html.

At present 22 nations compel voting, although penalties for non-voting vary significantly. Scholars worried about low participation rates in the United States and other advanced democracies have advocated compulsory voting laws. See, for instance, Arend Lijphart, “Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma,” *American Political Science Review* 91:1 (1997): 1-14, and “The Case for Compulsory Voting in the United States,” *Harvard Law Review* 121:2 (December 2007): 591-612. Critics question whether compulsory voting better represents the electorate's preferences (since these might include non-voting); see, for instance, Keith Jakee and Guang-Zhen Sun, “Is Compulsory Voting More Democratic?” *Public Choice* 129:1/2 (October 2006): 61-75. One recent cross-national study found that compulsory voting laws increase overall participation rates, but do not make electorates significantly more representative with respect to gender or educational level; paradoxically, it seems compulsory voting *increases* the preponderance of elderly voters. See Ellen Quintelier, Marc Hooghe and Sofie Marien, “The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Turnout Stratification Patterns: A Cross-national Analysis,” *International Political Science Review* 32:4 (September 2011): 396-416.

The political consequences of demography include not only impassions among age groups, but often violent conflicts among cultural, ethnic, and religious groups. Lebanon has not conducted a national census since 1932. Rwanda has not included ethnic categories in national censuses since 1994. As these examples suggest, politics influence populations as much as populations influence politics. One group's attempt to shape a national population can be overt and violent, as in genocides, forced migrations, and civil wars among rival ethnicities and religious sects; these attempts can also be overt and non-violent, as in efforts to alter immigration patterns, increase or decrease rates of childbirth, or advantage some national languages and cultures over others in public education; or they can be covert, as when groups attempt to alter a national population without employing the public arm of the state. Political demography considers whether groups in multi-ethnic and multi-confessional polities share a national identity, or whether ethnic and religious divisions threaten political unity.⁸ Under what conditions do stateless nations – Scots, French Canadians, Bosnian Serbs, Uighurs, Kurds – opt for independence rather than cohabitation? How do states succeed in binding the disparate groups within their borders and at what costs?

Navigating cultural and religious conflict, ensuring democratic representation of a nation's young as well as its old, and providing for growing numbers of dependents – these are only some of the demographic challenges facing policymakers in the United States and other nations. The following paper frames the central demographic challenges facing each of the world's regions. It then considers a number of factors that influence the size and structure of the world's populations, and concludes by evaluating the strategic significance of recent demographic developments. Throughout demography will be presented in all of its economic, political, and cultural complexity. Delegates of SCUSA are charged to identify the most important demographic flows, measure their magnitude and direction, and consider what policies might direct them more favorably to U.S. interests.

⁸ Myron Weiner defines the field of political demography as “the study of the size, composition, and distribution of population in relation to both government and politics. It is concerned with the political consequences of population change, especially the effects of population change on the demands made upon governments, on the performance of governments, and on the distribution of political power.” Political demography also considers how politics and populations influence one another: “the political causes of the movement of people, the relationship of various population configurations to the structures and functions of government, and the public policy directed at affecting the size, composition, and distribution of populations.” See Weiner, “Political Demography,” in National Academy of Sciences, *Rapid Population Growth: Consequences and Policy Implications* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971) 567. More recently, Jack Goldstone writes: “political demography often begins by asking what the relationship is between the population of a society and its natural resource base and what the relevant trends are in the ratio of total population to overall resources. But that is just a basic starting point. Political demography goes on to study what changes in the distribution of resources and political power are likely to arise from changes in the absolute and relative sizes of various population subgroups: urban or rural populations; groups bearing various religious, regional, or ethnic identities; various elite groups or political factions; and different age groups.” Goldstone, “A Theory of Political Demography: Human and Institutional Reproduction,” in Goldstone, Eric P. Kaufmann, and Monica Duffy Toft, eds., *Political Demography: How Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security and National Politics* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2012) 12.

I. Regional Demographics

Many of the world's deepest divides are demographic. Indeed, in many places humanity seems still to live by the laws Robert Malthus discovered, whereby nature enfeebles life and leaves little for humans to do about it. Thanks to twentieth-century demographers, however, we understand better than Malthus how this premodern world opens up into a brave new one. When nations modernize, these scholars discovered, gains in population initially outpace gains in productivity.⁹ Medicine, sanitation, and nutrition act as modernity's shock troops, implanting in Malthus's world the means to extend life expectancy and reduce infant mortality. Once these societies develop further, especially as their populations leave the countryside, birthrates fall – often precipitously. A modernizing nation's population becomes favorably unbalanced as the last large cohort passes through its working years, and then less favorably unbalanced as that same generation enters old age without a large cohort to care for it. Demographers say that during the first, favorable period nations enjoy a “demographic dividend”; in the second, less favorable period nations suffer a “demographic deficit.” This description of the demographic dimension of modernization, known formally as “demographic transition theory,” has stood up remarkably well for nearly a century.¹⁰ As Malthus stood to the pre-industrial world, demographic transition theorists stand to the industrial world.

It remains uncertain whether today's developing societies will succeed in harnessing their “demographic dividend” before facing the perils of a “deficit.” In order to do so, they must undergo not only economic but political modernization, a complex and hazardous process in which legitimate institutions emerge to channel powerful social forces towards peace and productivity, stability and cohesion. If they fail to develop institutions of this sort, developing countries may enter adverse demographic flows without the anchors and ballast taken for granted in the developed world.

⁹ There is an extensive literature on demographics and modernization. For helpful introductions, see “Demography: A New Science of Population,” *The Economist* (19 May 2012), <http://www.economist.com/node/21555533>; David Bloom, “7 Billion and Counting,” *Science* 333 (29 July 2011): 562-9; and Phillip Longman, “The Global Baby Bust,” *Foreign Affairs* 83:3 (May/June 2004): 64-79, along with Michael Teitelbaum and Jay Winter, “Demography is Not Destiny: The Real Impact of Falling Fertility,” *Foreign Affairs* 83:5 (September/October 2004): 152-4. Also see the scholarly sources cited below.

¹⁰ For surveys of the development of demographic transition theory, see Simon Szreter, “The Idea of Demographic Transition and the Study of Fertility Change: A Critical Intellectual History,” *Population and Development Review* 19:4 (December 1993): 659-701, and Dudley Kirk, “Demographic Transition Theory,” *Population Studies* 50:3 (November 1996): 361-87.

A. The Global Young

1. *The African Century? Demography and the Prospect of Development*

Of all the world's regions, Africa most resembles the world Malthus described. Infant mortality is high; life expectancy is low; and disease and resource scarcity endanger the population.¹¹ And yet in many African nations these gloomy data seem increasingly like the shadow of the past rather than the shape of the future. Infant mortality continues a steady decline; life expectancy, once stagnant, has begun to increase again. As a result, Africa's population is young and growing. The United Nations projects that Africa's population in 2045 will be twice what it is today.

The expansion and urbanization of Africa's population represents an opportunity – if policymakers can capture Africa's demographic dividend.¹² They might look already to a number of positive cases. Nigeria, for instance, has enjoyed robust economic growth over the past decade, due in part to its vast oil exports but even more so to domestic development.¹³ During the same time, however, Nigerian poverty has increased, particularly in its predominantly Muslim northern states, where the terrorist group Boko Haram has gained influence. Fertility is considerably higher in Nigeria's Muslim north than in its Christian south.¹⁴ Nigeria exhibits in microcosm the challenges likely to play out in the continent as a whole over the coming decades: a demographic impetus for modernization alongside a demographic threat to stability.

Africa's growth creates a host of challenges alongside its opportunities. How, for instance, can Africa's already-sprawling megacities cope with the 850 million men and women

¹¹ African infant mortality is currently 73 per thousand, compared to 4 per thousand in Western Europe. Life expectancy for the African continent as a whole is 56, compared to 80 in Western Europe. HIV/AIDS has impacted African populations more than those of any other continent. From 1950 to 1980 African life expectancy rose dramatically (from 37 to 50), then stalled from 1980 to 2005, in the low 50s. In some countries life expectancy fell significantly; in Kenya, for instance, life expectancy stood at 59 from 1985 to 1990, then fell ten percent, to 53, by 2000-2005. For analysis, consider Tukufu Zuberi and Kevin J.A. Thomas, "Demographic Projections, the Environment, And Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa" (Working Paper, United Nations Development Programme, February 2012), <http://web.undp.org/africa/knowledge/WP-2012-001-zuberi-thomas-demography-environment.pdf>.

¹² See "Africa's Population: Miracle or Malthus?" *The Economist* (17 December 2011), <http://www.economist.com/node/21541834>.

¹³ See in particular the World Bank's *Nigeria Economic Report* (May 2013), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/05/14/000333037_20130514101211/Rend ered/PDF/776840WP0Niger0Box0342041B00PUBLIC0.pdf. This report notes that Nigeria's economic growth has not reduced poverty as much as might be expected, particularly in rural areas (see p. 9). Economist Jim O'Neill has noted Nigeria's promising potential; see O'Neill, "How Africa Can Become the Next BRIC," *Financial Times* (26 August 2010), <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6c00e950-b153-11df-b899-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Z1X4p1UM>. Also see Elisabeth Rosenthal, "Nigeria Tested by Rapid Rise in Population," *New York Times* (14 April 2012), <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/world/africa/in-nigeria-a-preview-of-an-overcrowded-planet.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>.

¹⁴ For data on regional variations in fertility within Nigeria, see National Population Commission, "Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2008" (Abuja, Nigeria: Federal Republic of Nigeria, November 2009) 54, <http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR222/FR222.pdf>.

expected to join them by 2050?¹⁵ How can another billion be fed when food and water resources are already strained? To what degree can U.S. policy increase the likelihood of favorable outcomes?¹⁶ With a U.S. drone base in Djibouti, U.S. troops in Mali liaising with French and African troops, and U.S. Special Forces in central Africa hunting the warlord Joseph Kony, has the United States adopted a strategy of small foot-print operations to counter terrorism and promote regional stability?¹⁷ Will Africa's economic development, driven perhaps by its demographic dividend, make such operations more or less likely going forward?

The answers to all of these questions depend on the fundamental question of African politics: Can African politics nurture effective and legitimate political and economic institutions? Since the mid-century decline of the European empires, new political pathologies have emerged throughout the region to buttress authoritarian "strong men." Webs of tribal and ethnic loyalty have weakened national identity and reduced politics to a zero-sum competition. If there are today encouraging signs that these trends have taken a positive turn, the larger questions of African politics remain unanswered.

A popular series of state-run ads in Ethiopia shows confident Africans saying, "I am Africa, this is my century!" As a matter of demographic growth, this is likely to be the case; for the foreseeable future none of the world's regions will grow in population quite as rapidly as Africa. But whether this is so with respect to economic, political, and cultural development is still uncertain. How can U.S. policies harness African demographics to promote development and stability? What might U.S. policymakers learn from the distinct strategies, often focused on resource extraction rather than humanitarian assistance, that emerging rivals such as China have pursued in the region?

Recommended Readings

Ashford, Lori S. "Africa's Youthful Population: Risk or Opportunity?" *Population Reference Bureau* (2007).

Africa's young people will be the driving force behind economic prosperity in future decades, but only if policies and programs are in place to enhance their opportunities and encourage smaller families. A cycle of positive outcomes can result from having a larger,

¹⁵ See UN's *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision*, <http://esa.un.org/unup/>.

¹⁶ Along these lines, consider President Obama's recent "Power Africa" initiative. See Obama, "Remarks by President Obama at the University of Cape Town," 30 June 2013, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/30/remarks-president-obama-university-cape-town>.

¹⁷ On Mali, see Craig Whitlock, "Pentagon Deploys Small Number of Troops to War-Torn Mali," *Washington Post* (30 April 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-30/world/38921208_1_robert-firman-mali-bamako. On Djibouti, see Craig Whitlock, "Remote U.S. Base at Core of Secret Operations," *Washington Post* (25 October 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-25/world/35499227_1_drone-wars-drone-operations-military-base. On Kony, see Sudarsan Raghavan and Craig Whitlock, "Hunt for Joseph Kony, Elusive African Warlord, is Halted," *Washington Post* (3 April 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-03/world/38238379_1_central-african-republic-lra-dominic-ongwen.

better-educated workforce with fewer children to support—children who will in turn be more educated and employable, provided that institutions are strengthened and viable economic policies are in place. This policy brief outlines the opportunities and risks that can result from the large numbers of youth growing up in sub-Saharan Africa today

Bloom, David, David Canning, and Jaypee Sevilla. *The Demographic Dividend: A new perspective on the economic consequences of population change*. Rand Corporation, 2003.

There is long-standing debate on how population growth affects national economies. This report from Population Matters examines the history of this debate and synthesizes research on the topic. The authors, led by Harvard economist David Bloom, conclude that population age structure, more than size or growth per se, affects economic development, and that reducing high fertility can create opportunities for economic growth if the right kinds of educational, health, and labor-market policies are in place. The report also examines specific regions of the world and how their differing policy environments have affected the relationship between population change and economic development.

Bloom, David E., David Canning, Günther Fink, and Jocelyn Finlay. "Realizing the Demographic Dividend: Is Africa any different?" *Harvard Program on the Global Demography of Aging*, Working Paper 23.2007 (2007).

The demographic transition creates a window of opportunity during which economies may benefit from a temporary increase in the working age share of the population. While many economies have already enjoyed these benefits, they remain a promising opportunity for much of Sub-Saharan Africa. This paper attempts to show that Sub-Saharan Africa adheres to the same principles as the rest of the world with respect to the determinants of economic growth, including particularly the effects of demographic change. The authors conclude that, assuming a policy and institutional context that is conducive to economic growth, most Sub-Saharan countries have the potential to reap a sizable demographic dividend.

Eastwood, Robert, and Michael Lipton. "Demographic Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa: How big will the economic dividend be?" *Population Studies* 65, no. 1 (2011): 9-35.

In mid-demographic-transition, many Asian countries enjoyed a large demographic 'dividend': extra economic growth owing to falling dependant/workforce ratios, or slower natural increase, or both. The authors estimate the dividend, 1985-2025, in sub-Saharan Africa and its populous countries. Dependency and natural increase peaked around 1985, 20 years after Asia. The UN projects an acceleration of the subsequent slow falls but disregards slow declines in young-age mortality and thus, the authors argue, overestimates future fertility decline. The authors believe arithmetical and econometric evidence suggests an annual, if not total, dividend well below Asia's. The dividend arises

more from falling dependency than reduced natural increase, and could be increased by accelerating the fertility decline (e.g., by reducing young-age mortality) or by employing a larger workforce productively. Any dividend from transition apart, low saving in much of Africa (unlike Asia) means that, given likely natural increase, current consumption per person is unsustainable because it depletes capital per person.

Radelet, Steven C. *Emerging Africa: How seventeen countries are leading the way*. CGD Books, 2010.

This book describes the often overlooked positive changes that have taken place in much of Africa since the mid-1990s. The author examines seventeen countries and finds that five fundamental and sustained breakthroughs are making old assumptions increasingly untenable: 1) The rise of democracy brought on by the end of the Cold War and apartheid, 2) Stronger economic management, 3) The end of the debt crisis and a more constructive relationship with the international community, 4) The introduction of new technologies, especially mobile phones and the Internet, 5) The emergence of a new generation of leaders. The author concludes that these changes indicate the countries of emerging Africa seem poised to lead the continent out of the conflict, stagnation, and dictatorships of the past.

Additional Readings

“Africa’s Population: Miracle or Malthus?” *Economist*, 17 December 2011.

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Alden, Chris, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares De Oliveira. *China Returns to Africa: A rising power and a continent embrace*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

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<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/07/16/the-amazing-surprising-africa-driven-demographic-future-of-the-earth-in-9-charts/>

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Rosenthal, Elizabeth, "Nigeria Tested by Rapid Rise in Population," *New York Times*, 14 April 2012. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/world/africa/in-nigeria-a-preview-of-an-overcrowded-planet.html?pagewanted=all&r=1&>

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Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner. "Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies." *Journal of African economies* 6, no. 3 (1997): 335-376.

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Databases and Other Resources

Africa Development Bank

<http://www.afdb.org/en/>

Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

<http://www.gatesfoundation.org/>

Population Reference Bureau – Online Discussion: Is Sub-Saharan Africa an Exception to the Global Trend Toward Smaller Families?

<http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2008/discussiondec2008.aspx>

United Nations: Development – Population

<http://www.un.org/en/development/progareas/population.shtml>

World Bank – Africa Home

<http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr>

2. *Coming of Age: Sources of Middle Eastern Instability*

If African leaders fail to take advantage of their nations' soon-to-be favorable demographic flows, their populations might urbanize without modernizing. They would then resemble the populations of today's Middle East. In the past fifty years high fertility rates have nearly quadrupled the population of the Middle East, with over two thirds of that population now living in cities. The region has accordingly been home to large numbers of young people, many of whom, given the region's stagnant economies (apart from the energy sector), have gone unemployed.¹⁸ Conventional wisdom links the Middle East's contagious instability to its demographics and economics. The trouble is the Middle East's "youth bulge."¹⁹

Recently, however, this conventional story about the Middle East has come into question – not only because the correlation between unemployment and political radicalism is tenuous, but because a number of Middle Eastern nations have undergone dramatic declines in fertility.²⁰ In the region as a whole, fertility rates have been cut nearly in half.²¹ If these trends persist, the population of the Middle East will age significantly. By 2060 the number of Middle Easterners over sixty-five is projected to surpass the number under fourteen. The suddenness of this change portends a dramatic "demographic dividend" in the coming years, followed by an equally dramatic "demographic deficit." And unless Middle Eastern nations exploit the dividend, the deficit will be steep indeed.

What happens when a demographic transition precedes economic development? In the case of Africa, this question is perhaps of greater humanitarian than strategic concern to U.S. policymakers. But a number of Middle Eastern nations are of vital importance to U.S. foreign policy, and their looming demographic challenges should be viewed in this light. How might

¹⁸ For data on Middle Eastern youth populations and unemployment, see Amlan Roy, Sonali Punhani, and Liyan Shi, "Middle East and North Africa: Demographic Highlights" (Credit Suisse Economics Research, 25 February 2011). Compare Graham Fuller, *The Youth Factor: The New Demographics of the Middle East and the Implications for U.S. Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, June 2003).

¹⁹ On the Middle Eastern "youth bulge," see Graham Fuller, *The Youth Crisis in Middle Eastern Society* (Clinton Township, MI: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2004), and Navtej Dhillon, "Middle East Youth Bulge: Challenge or Opportunity?" Speech at Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 22 May 2008, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2008/05/22-middle-east-youth-dhillon>. For a stimulating reflection on the political consequences of "youth bulges" in general, see Gunnar Heinsohn, *Söhne und Weltmacht: Terror im Aufstieg und Fall der Nationen* (Piper Taschenbuch, 2008). For an English-language summary of Heinsohn's argument, see Christopher Caldwell, "Youth and War, A Deadly Duo," *Financial Times* (6 January 2007), <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/652fa2f6-9d2a-11db-8ec6-0000779e2340.html#axzz2XKXF1jE3>.

²⁰ For recent reevaluations of the link between poverty and terrorism, consider Alan Krueger, *What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Peter Bergen and Michael Lind, "A Matter of Pride: Why We Can't Buy Off the Next Osama Bin Laden," *Democracy: A Journal of Ideas* 3 (Winter 2007): 8-16. For an analysis of fertility decline in the Middle East, see Nicholas Eberstadt and Apoorva Shah, "Fertility Decline in the Muslim World: A Veritable Sea-Change, Still Curiously Unnoticed," The American Enterprise Institute Working Paper Series on Development Policy, No. 7 (December 2011), http://www.aei.org/files/2012/03/21/-fertility-decline-in-the-muslim-world-a-veritable-seachange-still-curiously-unnoticed_102606337292.pdf.

²¹ See Patrick Clawson, "Demography in the Middle East Population Growth Slowing, Women's Situation Unresolved," *MERIA Journal* 13:1 (March 2009), <http://www.gloria-center.org/2009/03/clawson-2009-03-04/>.

Iran's facing the prospect of population decline as soon as 2060 influence its appetite for strategic risk? How might the fact that Turkey's Kurds have nearly twice as many children as its ethnic Turks influence Turkey's foreign policy vis-à-vis Syria, Iraq, and other areas of interest to the United States?²²

The Arab Spring has destabilized not only the region's political institutions, but its demographics. Early data suggest that in the wake of its revolution Egypt may have reversed a fifty-year trend of falling birth rates.²³ In Egypt and elsewhere, ethnic and religious groups long excluded from politics are gaining access to the power of the state. While this trend increases the state's democratic legitimacy, it does not always increase the state's commitment to human rights, religious toleration, and ethnic diversity. How, then, might the United States promote peaceful democratization and political stability in the wake of the Arab Spring? Has austerity limited the reach of U.S. policy to the point where it is incapable of exerting a strong influence on the region's political and economic development? What tools will allow the region's leaders to cope with current and impending demographic challenges?

Recommended Readings

Jamal, Amaney. 2007. *Barriers to Democracy: The Other Side of Social Capital in Palestine and the Arab World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jamal's book is a thoughtful and thought-provoking study of social service organizations as mechanisms for clientalism and patronage. As the youth population grows, we might anticipate greater demands for this sorts of services. However, Jamal argues that the provision of social goods might actually undermine the project of democracy. This leads into our larger set of questions about the mobilization and utilization of youth in the Arab world.

²² For demographic data on Turkey's ethnic groups, see Sutay Yavuz, *Fertility Decline in Turkey: Differential Patterns by Turkish and Kurdish Speaking Women* (VDM Publishing, 2009); Yavuz, "Completing the Fertility Transition: Third Birth Developments by Language Groups in Turkey," *Demographic Research* 15 (24 November 2006): 435-60; Ismet Koc, Attila Hancioglu, and Alanur Cavlin, "Demographic Differentials and Demographic Integration of Turkish and Kurdish Populations in Turkey," *Population Research and Policy Review* 27:4 (2008): 447-57.

²³ See Kareem Fahim, "Egypt's Birthrate Rises as Population Control Policies Vanish," *New York Times* (3 May 2013), <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/03/world/middleeast/as-egypt-birthrate-rises-population-policy-vanishes.html?pagewanted=all>. According to UN statistics, Egypt's total fertility rate has declined in every five-year period since 1960-1965.

Norton, Augustus Richard. 2007. *Hezbollah: A Short History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

This is a great (and short) history of the Hizbollah party, which should serve as an example of the types of political organizations that exist to organize the young population behind an self-aware leadership. This could also be read in conjunction with the article on the Basij and the book on the Muslim Brotherhood cited below. Key for our discussion is that the youth don't operate as a homogenous entity – thus, understanding the diversity of political organizations in the region will help us grapple with the impact of demographics.

Hussain, Muzammil and Philip N. Howard. 2013. “What Best Explains Successful Protest Cascades? ICTs and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring.” *International Studies Review*, Vol 15 (2013): 48-66

For those given to quantitative analyses, this is an early attempt to explain how new technologies are interacting with a new generation of users to facilitate protest. The authors argue that in addition to young populations, technology infrastructure has been a key driver of the Arab Spring. That said, they also note the impact of state strategies for the control and employment of technology themselves, challenging any impulse towards technoutopianism.

Yom, Sean and F. Gregory Gause. 2012. “Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On.” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol 23, No 4 (Oct 2012): 74-88

Yom and Gause argue that the Arab Spring is an isolated phenomenon that will break on the shoals of monarchical resistance in the Gulf. This challenges a narrative of a youth-driven phenomenon by requiring the addition of some other set of variables. If all Arab states face growing populations of young people, why are only some Arab states experiencing massive unrest?

Roy, Olivier. 2012. “The Transformation of The Arab World.” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol 23, No 3 (July 2012): 5-18

Oliver Roy is a giant in the study of the Arab world, its regimes, and the West (his histories of Afghanistan are the standard in the field). In this article, he puts forward the idea that the Arab world is undergoing a fundamental change and, *contra* Yom and Gause, that the future is about to look very different.

Additional Readings

Zeghal, Malika. 2013. "Competing Ways of Life: Islamism, Secularism, and Public Order in the Tunisian Transition." *Constellations*, Vol 20, No 2, 2013

Bahgat, Gawdat. "Will Saudi Arabia Face an Energy Crisis?" *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies*, Vol 37, No 2, Summer 2012

Jeffrey, Craig. 2011. "Geographies of children and youth III: Alchemists of the revolution?" *Progress in Human Geography* Vol 37, No 1. Pp 145-152

Pearlman, Wendy. 2013. "Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings." *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol 11, No 2, June 2012 pp 387-409

Hinnebusch, Raymond. 2013. "Documenting the Roots and Dynamics of the Syrian Uprising." *The Middle East Journal*, Vol 67, No. 3, Summer 2013 pp 467-474

Fahmy, Hazem. 2012. "An Initial Perspective on 'The Winter of Discontent': The Root Causes of the Egyptian Revolution." *Social Research* Vol 79, No 2, Summer 2012 pp 349-376

Ostovar, Afshon. 2013. "Iran's Basij: Membership in a Militant Islamist Organization." *Middle East Journal*, Vol 67, No 3, Summer 2013 pg 345-361

Mitchell, Richard P. 1969. *The Society of Muslim Brothers*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Khaldun, Ibn. 2005. *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*. Franz Rosenthal, trans. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Batatu, Hanna. 2004. *The Old Social Class and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes, and of its Communists, Ba'athists and Free Officers*. London: Saqi.

Gause, F. Gregory. 2010. *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

L. Carl Brown. 1984. *International Politics and the Middle East*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

B. The Global Middle-Aged

If Africa and the Middle East raise the frightening prospect of a demographic transition without a demographic dividend, other regions demonstrate how favorable demographic flows can bolster rapid economic development. In 2001, economist Jim O’Neill coined the term “BRICs” to represent the four nations with large populations and growing economies that he considered drivers of future global growth: Brazil, Russia, India, and China.²⁴ By 2012, he predicted, these nations would account for fourteen percent of global GDP. In the event, they accounted for twenty-one percent.²⁵ Although economists differ over how much of this growth to attribute to demographic factors, each of these nations has benefitted significantly from favorable ratios of workers to dependents.²⁶ In several cases, however, these demographic levels now are ending, with potentially vast consequences for U.S. foreign policy.

3. *Forever Young: Demography and Strategy in India*

Of the four BRICs, India’s demographic profile most resembles those of the poor countries of Africa and the Middle East. India is by far the most fertile of the BRICs, yet not nearly as fertile now as it once was.²⁷ Since 1950 India’s birthrate has fallen from six to just under three children per woman. Relative to its BRIC peers this decline has been gradual; as a result, India has enjoyed a long-standing demographic dividend with no severe shift on the horizon.²⁸ While India’s rate of economic growth has not been as impressive as China’s, it

²⁴ Jim O’Neill, “Building Better Global Economic BRICs,” Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper, no. 66 (30 November 2011), <http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf>. For further discussion of BRICs, see Goldman Sachs, *BRICs and Beyond* (Goldman Sachs, 2007), <http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/brics-book/brics-full-book.pdf>, and “The Global Economy: Welcome to the Post-BRIC World,” *The Economist* (6 May 2013), <http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/05/global-economy>.

²⁵ O’Neill predicted that the BRICs would account for 14.2% of nominal GDP and 27% of GDP at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). According to the International Monetary Fund’s data, Brazil, Russia, India, and China accounted for 21% of nominal GDP and 26% of GDP at PPP. Notice that O’Neill did not anticipate changes in nominal GDP as accurately as he did GDP at PPP.

²⁶ As we shall see, Russia provides something of an exception to the “favorable demographics” rule among the BRICs. Russia’s falling life expectancy after its revolution, however, did have the morbid effect of constraining Russia’s dependency ratio.

²⁷ India’s total fertility rate (or number of children that the average woman can expect to have) is 2.66. Brazil’s is 1.9; China’s is 1.63; Russia’s is 1.44. Russia is currently experiencing depopulation, and the UN expects China to do the same soon – in 2030-2035. Brazil’s population, by contrast, is projected to decline relatively late (beginning in 2050-2055). Russia is currently experiencing depopulation, and the UN expects China to do the same soon – in 2030-2035. Brazil’s population, by contrast, is projected to decline relatively late (beginning in 2050-2055). The UN predicts that Indian fertility will not dip below replacement level (2.1) before 2030-2035. For a helpful analysis of Indian demographic data, see K.S. James, “India’s Demographic Change: Opportunities and Challenges,” *Science* 333 (29 July 2011): 576-80.

²⁸ Since India’s fertility has been declining, the ratio of elderly dependents to the working-age population will grow as well; however, the more gradual the decline in fertility, the easier it is to accommodate this change. To get some sense of how India compares to the other BRICs, consider its “Old-Age Dependency Ratio” (the ratio of population

enjoys more favorable demographics and considerably more untapped potential. Only thirty-one percent of India's population lives in cities, for instance, as compared to China's fifty-one percent, and only 29% of India's women are in the labor force, compare to 68% of China's.²⁹ The UN predicts that India will overtake China as the world's most populous country in 2028, and on some accounts it could surpass the United States in GDP by 2050.³⁰

These considerations make India of increasing strategic relevance to U.S. policymakers as they "pivot" to Asia. The logic for U.S.-Indian cooperation is strong: both are democracies stamped by a shared British heritage; both enjoy quasi-insular geographic positions. Indeed, the only significant breach in India's insularity, its low-lying northwestern border with Pakistan, ensures that India senses the threats of terrorism and nuclear proliferation at least as viscerally as the United States does. India's proximity to and persistent conflicts with China also help to align its foreign policy priorities with those of U.S. policymakers.³¹

What can the United States do to facilitate increased strategic cooperation with India? To what degree can U.S. policymakers assist Indian leaders as they confront their nations' demographic challenges: rapid urbanization, gross socio-economic inequality, fertility imbalances between India's Islamic north and its Hindu south, and the need to accommodate to a gradually aging population? Will India's political elite strengthen and expand the pro-market economic reforms of the early 1990s, or will the aftershocks of the global recession bring a return to the less market-oriented economic policies India adopted in the decades following independence? Will India's middle class continue to grow and to support economic and political liberalization? How should the United States' desire for stability in Pakistan and a graceful exit from Afghanistan figure in its India policy? Can the United States and India address the security concerns that have led Pakistan, an increasingly ungoverned multi-ethnic state, to support the Afghan Taliban? What role should India play in the United States' efforts to balance against a rising China?

over sixty-five to population 15-64). In 2010, this ratio was 7.8 for India; the UN projects it will be 19 in 2050. This is a significant increase of some 250 percent. China, however, will change from 11.4 in 2010 to 39 in 2050 (+342%), and Brazil will change from 10.2 to 36.2 (+354%). Russia, by contrast, will change from 18.2 to 32.8 (+180%); the small magnitude of change has to do with the high starting point.

²⁹ For data on urbanization, see the UN's *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision*, <http://esa.un.org/unup/>. For data on women in the work force, see United Nations, *The World's Women 2010: Trends and Statistics* (New York: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2010).

³⁰ Goldman Sachs predicted in 2007 that Indian GDP would surpass US GDP before 2050. See Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group, *BRICs and Beyond* (New York: Goldman Sachs Group, 2007). More recently, Goldman analysts have presented the Indian economy as approaching but not surpassing US GDP. For a summary of Goldman's 2012 report, see Charles Kupchan, "The World in 2050: When the 5 Largest Economies Are the BRICs and Us," *The Atlantic* (17 February 2012), <http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/02/the-world-in-2050-when-the-5-largest-economies-are-the-brics-and-us/253160/>. For a more recent assessment, which places the US economy slightly ahead of India's in 2050, see PwC Economics, *World in 2050: The BRICs and Beyond: Prospects, Challenges, and Opportunities* (January 2013), http://www.pwc.com/im/en/publications/assets/pwc_world_in_2050_report_january_2013.pdf.

³¹ India and China fought one another in 1962, 1967, and 1987. In April and May of 2013 Chinese and Indian soldiers came into contact along India's northern border. In January of 2012, the U.S. Department of Defense's *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* noted that the United States is "investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India."

Recommended Readings

Bloom, David E. "Population Dynamics in India and Implications for Economic Growth." In *The Handbook of the Indian Economy*, edited by Chetan Ghate. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Accessed September 16, 2013. http://southasiainstitute.harvard.edu/website/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Bloom_PopulationdynamicsiIndia.pdf.

This paper argues that demographic change in India is opening up new economic opportunities. If working-age people can be productively employed, India's economic growth stands to accelerate. The author argues that policy choices can potentiate India's realization of economic benefits stemming from demographic change, but that failure to take advantage of the opportunities inherent in these demographic changes will lead to economic stagnation.

Feigenbaum, Evan A. "India's Rise, America's Interest." *Foreign Affairs*. March 1, 2010. Accessed September 16, 2013. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65995/evan-a-feigenbaum/indias-rise-americas-interest>.

This article argues that the future of the U.S.-Indian relationship will depend on whether India chooses to align with the United States and whether it sustains its own economic and social changes. Although the United States and India share important interests – restoring global growth, protecting the global commons, enhancing global energy security, and ensuring a balance of power in Asia – the ultimate test of the relationship will be whether Washington and New Delhi can turn their common interests into complementary policies around the world.

James, K. S. "India's Demographic Change: Opportunities and Challenges." *Science* (2011): 576-580.

This paper discusses emerging demographic patterns and its opportunities and challenges for India. It investigates the specificities in the demographic transition in terms of various demographic parameters and the lack of homogeneity in the transition across states in the country. It presents some opportunities that can arise from having demographic changes, particularly the demographic dividend and interstate migration to overcome labor shortage in some parts. At the same time, it suggests that there are serious challenges in the form of enhancing human capital development, addressing the issue of skewed sex ratio, and rising social and political unrest.

Kronstadt, K. Allen and Sonia Pinto. *U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues*. Congressional Research Service, 2013.

This report systematically examines the major strategic perspectives held by policymakers in the United States and India and the ways in which these perspectives are variously harmonious or discordant. It begins with a brief review of the pre-2005 history of U.S.-India security relations followed by discussion of key U.S. security interests related to India. It then explores India's defense posture writ large and identifies convergent and divergent security interests. It suggests that there are a number of challenges and opportunities for future security cooperation.

Wolf, Charles Jr., Siddhartha Dalal, Julie DaVanzo, Eric V. Larson, Alisher Akhmedjonov, Harun Dogo, Meilinda Huang, Silvia Montoya. "China and India, 2025: A Comparative Assessment." National Defense Research Institute. Accessed September 16, 2013. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1009.pdf

This monograph focuses on the progress China and India seem likely to achieve from 2010 through 2025, as well as on some of the major problems they both may encounter along the way. It presents a comparative assessment of each country's prospects in this period across four domains: demography, macroeconomics, science and technology, and defense spending and procurement. The monograph concludes with implications for policy and for further research.

Additional Readings

Central Intelligence Agency. "The World Factbook: India." Accessed September 16, 2013. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html>.

Cohen, Stephen P. *Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum*. Brookings Inst Press, 2013.

Chowdhury, Debasish Roy. "Deadly Demographics: Women Face Grim Odds in Male-heavy Societies Like China, India" *South China Morning Post*. January 30, 2013. Accessed September 16, 2013. <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1138110/deadly-demographics-women-face-grim-odds-male-heavy-societies-china-india>.

Freakonomics Blog. "Tiger vs. Dragon: A Demographic Comparison of China and India." Accessed September 16, 2013. <http://freakonomics.com/2011/09/12/tiger-vs-dragon-a-demographic-comparison-of-india-and-china/>.

Golley, Jane, and Rod Tyers. "Demographic Dividends, Dependencies, and Economic Growth in China and India." *Asian Economic Papers* 11, no. 3 (2012): 1-26.

Kaplan, Robert D. "India's Geographic Dilemma." In *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate*, by Robert D. Kaplan, 228–254. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2012.

Karl, David J. "US-India Relations: The Way Forward." *Orbis* 56, no. 2 (2012): 308-327.

Miller, Majari Chatterjee. "India's Feeble Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs*. April 3, 2013. Accessed September 16, 2013. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139098/manjari-chatterjee-miller/indias-feeble-foreign-policy>.

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Nilekani, Nandan. "India's Demographic Moment." *Strategy and Business*, August 27, 2009. Accessed September 16, 2013. <http://www.strategy-business.com/article/09305?pg=all#authors>.

Pant, Harsh V. "The Pakistan Thorn in China–India–US Relations." *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (2012): 83-95.

Sharma, Ruchir. "The Rise of the Rest of India." *Foreign Affairs*. August 12, 2013. Accessed September 16, 2013. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139646/ruchir-sharma/the-rise-of-the-rest-of-india>.

Siddiqi, Toufiq. "Pakistan, India, China, and the United States: Energy, Climate Change, and National Security." *Orbis* 57, no. 4 (2013): 615-626.

United Nations. "World Population Prospects, the 2012 Revision." Accessed September 16, 2013. <http://esa.un.org/wpp/>.

Wharton School. "India's Demographic Dividend: Asset or Liability?" Accessed September 16, 2013. <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/article.cfm?articleid=4717>.

4. *Rich and Poor, Young and Old: Demographic Challenges to China's Rise*

China's rise to global prominence since Deng Xiaoping's 1978 economic reforms has been dramatic and seemingly inexorable. In the past thirty-five years the Chinese economy has grown at just under ten percent each year, with the result that national GDP is more than fifty times larger now what it was then.³² Once projected to surpass U.S. GDP by mid-century, China now seems likely to do so before 2020. Accompanying Deng's economic reforms were a set of severe demographic policies. China's infamous "one child policy" accelerated a decline in fertility that had been underway since the early 1960s, when Chinese women had an average of six children. Today, China's fertility rate stands at 1.63.³³ China's dramatic economic growth has therefore been aided by one of the strongest demographic tailwinds the world has seen.

But this is about to change. Starting in 1970, the median age of China's population has risen steadily from nineteen to thirty-six (at present), and it is projected to reach the mid-forties by the middle of the century. In 1970, four percent of China's population was over sixty-five; in 2010, 8.4% are; in 2050, it is projected that twenty-four percent will be. In short, China is entering a demographic headwind as strong as the tailwind that supported its recent growth.³⁴

How well equipped is China to solve its mid-term and long-term demographic problems? While it would seem that Chinese leaders could address most of their nation's looming demographic challenges simply by eliminating the one child policy, this is not necessarily the panacea it appears to be. The generation currently reaching childbearing age have grown up in small families and expecting someday to have small families; it is not yet clear to what degree the one-child *policy* has in fact become a one-child *norm*, which would presumably be more difficult for the Chinese state to alter. Also, in many of China's urban areas, fertility has fallen below one-child per woman, suggesting that much of China may already have undergone the demographic transition other modernizing countries have experienced.

Changes in fertility have accompanied rapid urbanization. Over the past thirty-five years, some five hundred million Chinese have left the countryside for the city, and the United Nations

³² For a helpful summary of recent Chinese economic history, see Wayne Morrison, "China's Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 4 March 2013), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf>. The data quoted is GDP at Purchasing Power Parity, between 1980 and 2012. If one considers GDP in constant 2012 US dollars, the Chinese economy is thirty-eight times larger now than it was in 1978. Many economists suggest that using macroeconomic data at PPP is particularly important in the case of China, given the Chinese government's involvement in setting Yuan-Dollar exchange rates.

³³ China's fertility rate of 1.63 applies to the years 2005-2010.

³⁴ On Chinese demographics, see in particular: Xizhe Peng, "China's Demographic History and Future Challenges," *Science* 333 (29 July 2011): 581-7. The potential strategic implications of China's demographic developments have been widely noted. Feng Wang of the Brookings Institution has written a number of analytical piece on this theme; see for instance, "Wakeup Call in Beijing, From Census Takers," *Brookings* (4 May 2011), <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/05/04-beijing-census-wang>. Also see "Demography: China's Achilles Heel," *The Economist* (21 April 2012), <http://www.economist.com/node/21553056>.

projects that China's cities will add another 320 million individuals by 2100.³⁵ The scale of this migration has strained Chinese municipal and national governments' ability to provide adequate social services; it has also taxed China's environment, raising concerns over air, water, and food safety. And it has proven socially disruptive, as the experiences of younger generations living in cities differ radically from the experiences of their parents and grandparents remaining in rural areas.³⁶ In the face of these difficulties, is the Chinese one-party system sufficiently resilient and innovative to craft policies that sustain economic growth while preserving political stability? Will the vast Chinese diaspora, as well as the Republic of China on Taiwan, help or harm Beijing's efforts?

What are the consequences of China's demographic challenges for U.S. policy? Will slowing economic growth make China any less of a threat to U.S. interests in the region? Is it possible to interpret recent increases in Chinese defense spending and international provocations as signs of future weakness rather than rising strength? How should these demographic factors influence U.S. strategists as they pivot to Asia?

Recommended Readings

Stratfor: Global Intelligence. 2012. "The State of the World: Assessing China's Strategy" Accessed September 11, 2013. <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/state-world-assessing-chinas-strategy>.

This article introduces three core Chinese interests: domestic stability, a strong economy (currently based on exports), and the maintenance of buffer states – Tibet and the Xinjiang Province – as insulation for the Han population. The first interest, domestic stability, drives all other Chinese considerations. After a brief discussion of the Chinese economy and the need to move beyond a focus on low-cost manufacturing, the article focuses on Chinese security concerns. The article questions the effectiveness of the Chinese military, citing the enduring need for the military to support domestic security efforts instead of prepare for war.

³⁵ For these data, see the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, *World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision* and *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision*. Note that the earliest data appear in 1980 and they end in 2011. These data do not distinguish between Chinese who migrate from the countryside to the city and Chinese born in cities. In January 2012 it was widely reported in U.S. media that China's urban population had surpassed its rural population for the first time in China's history (see for instance Jaime FlorCruz, "China's Urban Population Outnumbers Rural Dwellers for First Time," *CNN.com* (17 January 2012)).

³⁶ In addition to the social disruption of urbanization, economic growth itself produces profound disruptions. The doubling of Chinese GDP approximately every seven years (assuming 10% annual growth) leads to each generation growing up in radically different material circumstances.

Beckley, Michael. "China's Century: Will America's Edge Endure?" *International Security*, Winter 2011. Accessed September 11, 2013. Available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Chinas_Century.pdf.

Beckley addresses two key arguments within the “rise of China” debate. First addressing concerns over U.S. decline, Beckley argued that the United States has never been stronger. Beckley then addresses concerns over the impact of globalization on U.S. industry, concluding that, contrary to popular scholarship, the United States is the economically dominant force in the international system (seeking an opposing view? See Arvind Subramanian and “The Inevitable Superpower: Why China’s Dominance is a Sure Thing,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2011). Beckley characterizes the Chinese economy as dependent on low cost manufacturing by contrast to the U.S. economy’s focus on high-value “products like intellectual property.”

Morrison, Wayne M. September 5, 2013. “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States”. Congressional Research Service 2013. Accessed September 11, 2013. Available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf>.

This paper summarizes several of the key economic concerns facing China as it works to transition its economy from its current focus on exports to consumption. Industrial policies and State Owned Enterprises (SOE) hinder Chinese efforts to move beyond an export economy and create a truly free market. A flawed banking system reinforces the dominance of SOEs, while an undervalued currency helps keep the Chinese economy dependent on low-cost manufacturing. Additional issues affecting the economy include pollution and a limited “rule of law” that prevents foreign companies from confidently investing in the Chinese economy. This reading concludes with a brief overview of China’s 12th 5 Year Plan, which depicts the future of the Chinese economy.

Feng, Wang. 2012. Demographic Transition: Racing Towards the Precipice. Brookings Institution. Accessed September 11, 2013. Available at <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/articles/2012/6/china%20demographics%20wang/demographics%20china%20wang.pdf>.

Wang Feng examines the fundamental demographic problem facing China: China will grow old before it grows rich. Examining demographic trends in China, mainly the rising age of the population, Feng concludes that the Chinese economy will slow down for two reasons. First, private savings, a key source of capital for Chinese manufacturing, will decrease as the Chinese population enters retirement. Second, China’s cheap labor supply will shrink significantly, a trend exacerbated by an unwieldy healthcare system that prevents labor mobility from rural to urban areas. Feng posits two possible “fixes:”

education reform and a new, mobile healthcare system that does not tie people to the land of their birth.

Den Boer, Andrea and Valerie M Hudson. “A Surplus of Men, a Deficit of Peace: Security and Sex Ratios in Asia’s Largest States.” *International Security*, Spring 2002. Accessed September 11, 2013. Available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092100>.

This article looks at a specific demographic trend, “surplus” males or “bare branches,” on the future of Chinese stability. Hudson and Den Boer examine the growing number of males who, unable to find stability through marriage as Chinese men increasingly outnumber Chinese women, turn towards violent means of achieving social status. Disaffected males pose a significant threat to domestic stability, accounting for several violent Chinese rebellions in the 1800s. Historically, countries dealing with populations of surplus males must co-opt them – that is, offer them positions of power – or use these males in “national projects,” including wars and dangerous civil works.

Additional Readings

Anderson, J. Part 2: The Aging of China. Chapter 2 in *How to Think About China*. UBS Investment and Research: Asian Economic Perspectives. Accessed September 11. Available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.ceibs.edu/ContentPages/52742413.pdf.

BBC. “Li Keqiang: China economy at crucial stage.” BBC.com. Accessed September 11, 2013. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24047426>.

Dedrick, Jason, Kenneth L. Kraemer, and Greg Linden. “Capturing Value in Global Networks: Apple’s iPad and iPhone.” Accessed September 11, 2013. Available at http://pcic.merage.uci.edu/papers/2011/Value_iPad_iPhone.pdf.

Den Boer, Andrea M. and Valerie M. Hudson. “Bare Branches and Security in Asia.” *Harvard Asia Pacific Review*. Accessed September 11, 2013. Available at http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~hapr/winter07_gov/hudson.pdf.

The Economist. “Marking Time at the fringes.” The Economist.com. Accessed September 11, 2013. Available at <http://www.economist.com/node/16539510>.

The Economist. “The Most Surprising Demographic Crisis: A new census raises questions about the future of China’s one-child policy.” The Economist.com (May 5, 2011). Accessed September 11, 2013. Available at <http://www.economist.com/node/18651512>.

Fischer, Andrew. "The Great Transformation of Tibet and Xinjiang: a Comparative Analysis of Rapid Labour Transition in Times of Rapid Growth in Two Contested Minority Regions of China." Paper Presented at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (2011). Accessed September 11, 2013. Available at http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/33024/Metis_174813.pdf.

Quanbao Jiang & Jesús J. Sánchez-Barricarte. "Bride price in China: The obstacle to 'Bare Branches' seeking marriage." *The History of the Family*, 17:1, 2-15 (2012). Accessed September 11, 2013. Available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1081602X.2011.640544>.

Roberts, Dexter. "China's Savers Block the Consumer Economy." *BloombergBusinessweek* (online). Accessed September 11, 2013. Available at <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-07-11/chinas-savers-block-the-consumer-economy>.

Wang, Jisi, "China's Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Power Finds Its Way," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2011. Accessed September 11, 2013. Available at <http://www.ciss.pku.edu.cn/EN/DocumentView.aspx?id=666>.

5. *Lula's Legacy: Brazil's Rise and South America's Future*

Latin America has undergone a demographic transition comparable to China's, but without the steep drop off in population growth that looms on China's horizon. In the early 1950s, Latin America's population was expanding by 2.7% annually, more rapidly than any other region in the world, but today its growth has slowed to 1.2%, comparable to Asia and North America's and considerably less than Africa's.³⁷ In that same period, Latin American fertility has fallen dramatically – from six children per woman in the 1950s to just over two today – and urbanization has progressed rapidly, to the point where North America is the only region in which a greater percentage of the population lives in cities.³⁸ Until recently the demographic challenges facing Latin American nations had to do with the size and growth of their populations. Now, these same nations face the challenge of caring for populations weighted increasingly towards the old rather than the young.³⁹

Given Brazil's outsized power relative to neighboring countries, the demographic challenges its aging population represents are of particular interest to U.S. policymakers.⁴⁰ Brazil accounts for a third of Latin America's population, 42% of its GDP, and some 50% of its military spending.⁴¹ Brazil has started to translate its growing power into regional and global influence by promoting South American economic integration, deploying a large peacekeeping

³⁷ The next-highest rates of growth in the period 1950-1955 were 2.2 in Oceania and 2.1 in Africa. In 2010-2015 the population of Asia grew at 1.1%; the population of North America grew at .9%; the population of Africa grew at 2.5%.

³⁸ Seventy-nine percent of Latin America and the Caribbean's population is urban, compared to 82% of North America's. South America (the nations south of the Panama Canal) has 83% of its population living in cities, greater than any sub-region except Australia (89%). The shock of urbanization, however, has not been as great as in China, since the population of Latin America and the Caribbean was started from a higher rate of urbanization. If one compares 1950 to 2010, for instance, Latin America and the Caribbean changed from 41% of population living in cities to seventy-nine percent, whereas China changed from 12% to 49%. And of course China's population is significantly larger than that of Latin America and the Caribbean.

³⁹ Daniel Cotlear, "Population Aging: Is Latin America Ready?" Chap. 1 in *Population Aging: Is Latin America Ready?*, ed. Cotlear (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2011), p. 8, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2542>. This entire volume is an excellent resource for the study of aging in Latin America. One should also see Richard Jackson et al., *Latin America's Aging Challenge* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2009), <http://csis.org/publication/latin-americas-aging-challenge>; and Jorge Brea, "Population Dynamics in Latin America," *Population Bulletin* 58:1 (March 2003), <http://www.prb.org/Publications/PopulationBulletins/2003/PopulationDynamicsinLatinAmericaPDF318KB.aspx>.

⁴⁰ For a summary view of Brazilian demographics, see Cynthia Gorney, "Machisma," *National Geographic Magazine* (September 2011), <http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/print/2011/09/girl-power/gorney-text>.

⁴¹ In 2010 Brazil's population was 194.9 billion; the population of Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole was 590 billion. Brazil's share of the global economy has increased steadily since 1970, and today it is the seventh-largest economy in the world. Among its immediate neighbors in South America Brazil looms larger still. Its economy is more than five times larger than the next-wealthiest nations (Argentina and Columbia), and its military spending is significantly greater as well. Brazil's GDP was \$2.4 trillion in 2011, compared to \$474 billion in Argentina and \$365 billion in Colombia. For data on military spending see the database compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), <http://milexdata.sipri.org/>. According to SIPRI, Brazil spent \$36.9 billion on its military in 2011, compared to \$10.3 billion in Colombia and \$5.4 billion in Chile.

force to Haiti, and advocating greater inclusion of developing countries in international organizations.⁴² Like many nations in Latin America, however, Brazil's demographic tailwind will eventually transform into a headwind. The ratio of Brazilians over sixty-five to working-age Brazilians, for instance, is projected to grow significantly by 2050. And this represents a serious obstacle to Brazil's ongoing development.

For the most part, the United States has supported Brazil's emergence on the global stage.⁴³ But a number of recent challenges – ranging from Honduras's 2009 constitutional crisis to negotiations with Iran – have strained this relationship. It is also unclear how durable Brazil's (and much of Latin America's) economic liberalization will prove, given that the region has struggled to overcome corruption, political instability, and vast inequalities among ethnic groups and between rural and urban populations. Poverty is endemic and perceptions of injustice are widespread among Brazil's poor. These disparities shape gender and race relations, and they assume increasing political relevance in light of Brazil's highly uneven governance at the national and regional levels.

How, then, should U.S. leaders engage Brazil as it continues to grow in power? At what point, if any, might Brazil's rise threaten U.S. security, which since the nineteenth century has relied on hegemony in the Americas? To what extent should Brazil's looming demographic challenges influence U.S. policy?

Recommended Readings

Armijo, Leslie Elliott, and Sean W. Burges. "Brazil, the Entrepreneurial and Democratic Bric." *Northeastern Political Science Association* 42, no. 1 (2010): 15-37.

By most objective metrics, Brazil is the least imposing of the “BRICs countries”—less populous than China and India, slower-growing in recent years than China, India, or Russia, and the only member of the group lacking nuclear weapons. The authors argue that Brazil's material capabilities are more significant than commonly supposed. Moreover, Brazil's democratic transition in the mid-1980s, along with that of its neighbors, has for the first time enabled Brazil to realize its promise of becoming a regional leader in South America. On the basis of its democratic and regional

⁴² Brazil, along with Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, established the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) in 1991; in 2008, Brazil joined its neighbors in establishing the Union of South American Nations (Unasur). On Brazil's role in Haiti see in particular Peter Meyer, “Brazil-U.S. Relations” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 9 February 2011), p. 13, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf>. Brazil has commanded the U.N. Stabilization Mission since 2004. Meyer reports that “some 10,000 Brazilian military personnel have rotated through the country since the start of [the mission], and with 2,200 officers and soldiers currently on the ground, Brazil is the largest peacekeeping contingent in Haiti.”

⁴³ The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy, for instance, “welcome[s] Brazil's leadership and seek[s] to move beyond dated North-South divisions to pursue progress on bilateral, hemispheric, and global issues.” White House, *National Security Strategy*, May 2010, p. 44.

prominence, Brazil has become an effective political entrepreneur at the global level, initiating and participating in multilateral institutions as diverse as the trade G20, the financial G20, and now the BRICs club. On issues of style, inclusion, and distributive justice, Brazil reliably sides with the “South.” Yet its core public policy instincts embrace familiar “Northern” preferences: liberal, and mixed-capitalist, democracy.⁴⁴

Bodman, Samuel W., Chairs James D. Wolfensohn, and Project Director Julia E. Sweig. "Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations." *Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Report No. 66* (2011).

This CFR report argues that given Brazil’s rise over the past two decades, the United States must now alter its view of the region and pursue a broader and more mature relationship with the new Brazil. It is time that the foreign policy of the United States reflects the new regional reality and adjusts to advance U.S. interests, given past and future changes. Brazil and the United States are now entering a period that has great potential to solidify a mature friendship, one that entails ever deepening trust in order to secure mutual benefits. This kind of relationship requires the two countries to move beyond their historic oscillation between misinterpretation, public praise, and rebuke, and instead approach both cooperation and inevitable disagreement with mutual respect and tolerance.⁴⁵

Brands, Hal, and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. *Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010.

This monograph analyzes Brazilian grand strategy under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. During Lula’s nearly 8 years in office, he has pursued a multi-tiered grand strategy aimed at hastening the transition from unipolarity to a multipolar order in which international rules, norms, and institutions are more favorable to Brazilian interests. Lula has done so by emphasizing three diplomatic strategies: soft-balancing, coalition-building, and seeking to position Brazil as the leader of a more united South America. This strategy has successfully raised Brazil’s profile and increased its diplomatic flexibility, but it has also exposed the country to four potent strategic dilemmas that could complicate or undermine its ascent. These dilemmas touch on issues ranging from anemic macroeconomic performance to rising tensions in Brazil’s relationship with the United States. In the future, the efficacy of Brazilian grand strategy—and its implications for

⁴⁴ Abstract from, Leslie Elliott Armijo and Sean W. Burges. "Brazil, the Entrepreneurial and Democratic Bric." *Northeastern Political Science Association* 42, no. 1 (2010): 15-37.

⁴⁵ Samuel W. Bodman and Chairs James D. Wolfensohn, and Project Director Julia E. Sweig. "Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations." *Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Report No. 66* (2011).

U.S. interests and the global system—will be contingent on how Lula’s successors address these dilemmas.⁴⁶

Burges, Sean, “Brazil as a bridge between old and new powers?” *International Affairs* 89, no. 3 (2013): 577-594.

Brazilian foreign policy demonstrates an interesting double aspect in the changing global system. Its rhetoric and overt positioning is framed around the idea of Brazil as a value-creating actor, while in reality there are significant value-claiming characteristics at the core of its approach to regional and global affairs. The key for Brazil is its position as a ‘bridge’ between the South and the North, which allows its diplomats to establish the country as a critical coalition organizer and ideational leader for southern actors looking for major changes in global governance systems, and a central interlocutor for northern actors trying to cope with pressure from the South. Brazil's ambitions are simple: focusing more on an improved relative position, rather than a complete reformulation of the international system, which serves it well in economic, political, and security terms. To explain this argument the article focuses on Brazilian engagement with Africa and South America, as well as the country's approach to major negotiations such as the WTO's Doha round, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and the evolution of regional governance mechanisms such as the Organization of American States and the recently created Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. The pattern that emerges is one of Brazil working to create a consensus around its position, using its consequent leadership to improve Brazilian leverage in the regional and global arena.

Kahler, Miles. "Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating Change in a Resilient Status Quo." *International Affairs* 89, no. 3 (2013): 711-29.

The author argues that the rising BICs (as he calls them) are unlikely to threaten the current international order, although the final outcome will be determined by three variables: preferences towards global governance, capabilities, and strategies. He also believes that the BICs will continually hedge their bets on complete integration in the global order due to domestic fears of political and economic instability. Despite his doubts on the BICs’ overall impact, he does recognize that these emerging powers will play a role in righting global macroeconomic imbalances and climate change.

Meyer, Peter J. "Brazil-U.S. Relations." *Congressional Research Service* (2013).

⁴⁶ Summary from Hal Brands, Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. *Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010.

As its economy has grown to be the seventh largest in the world, Brazil has utilized its newfound economic power to consolidate its influence in South America and play a larger role in international affairs. The Obama Administration's National Security Strategy recognizes Brazil as an emerging center of influence, and welcomes the country's leadership on bilateral, hemispheric, and global issues. U.S.-Brazil relations generally have been positive in recent years, though Brazil has prioritized strengthening relations with neighboring countries and expanding ties with nontraditional partners in the "developing South." While some foreign policy disagreements have emerged, the United States and Brazil continue to engage on issues such as security, energy, trade, human rights, and the environment.⁴⁷

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Barry, Christopher B., John W. Peavy III, and Mauricio Rodriguez. "Performance Characteristics of Emerging Capital Markets." *Financial Analysts Journal* 54, no. 1 (1998): 72-80.

Bremmer, Ian. *The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War between States and Corporations?* New York, N.Y.: Portfolio, 2010.

Gray, Tim. "In Brazil, a Reminder of Emerging-Market Risks." *The New York Times*, July 6, 2013.

Hakim, Peter. "Us-Brazil Relations: Expect More Conflict." In, *Infolatam* (October 21, 2010). <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2490>.

Hochstetler, Kathryn. "Climate Rights and Obligations for Emerging States: The Cases of Brazil and South Africa." *Social Research* 79, no. 4 (2012): 957-82.

James, Harold. "The Rise of the Brics." *The International Economy* (2008).

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Narlikar, Amrita. "Negotiating the Rise of New Powers." *International Affairs* 89, no. 3 (2013): 561-76.

Opinion. "As Brazil Snubs the U.S., Who Loses?" *The New York Times*, September 24, 2013.

⁴⁷ Summary from Peter Meyer, "Brazil-U.S. Relations." Congressional Research Service, February 27, 2013, pg. 1.

Peng, Lu. "Political Confidence in the New Emerging Economies: A Comparative Analysis of the Brics Countries." *Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences* 6, no. 2 (2013): 56-83.

Roberts, Cynthia. "Polity Forum: Challengers or Stakeholders? Brics and the Liberal World Order." *Polity* 42 (2010): 1-13.

Rottner, Wesley B. *Brazil and Its Neighbors: Background and U.S. Relations*. Latin American Political, Economic, and Security Issues. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010.

Sheth, Jagdish N. "Impact of Emerging Markets on Marketing: Rethinking Existing Perspectives and Practices." *Journal of Marketing* 75, no. July 2011 (2011): 166 –82.

Brazilian On-line Resources

<http://veja.abril.com.br/> : Veja is the equivalent of our *New York Times*

<http://oglobo.globo.com/> : Globo is the most known source of media in Brazil

<http://redeglobo.globo.com/> : Rede Globo is a lesser known Globo

<http://www.sbt.com.br/home/> : SBT is similar to Globo

6. *The Dying Bear Reborn? Autocracy, Energy, and Population Growth in Russia*

Russia has played the most dramatic part in the world's recent demographic history. Nowhere has demographic decline been as catastrophic; nowhere have demographics figured more prominently in national debates.⁴⁸ As the Russian economy contracted by nearly two thirds in the 1990s, life expectancy fell from 69 to 65, while fertility collapsed from 2.1 (the "replacement rate") to 1.3 births per woman. As a result, in the late 1990s the Russian population began to shrink. According to UN projections, it will continue to shrink for the remainder of the twenty-first century – even if Russian fertility revives.⁴⁹

The potential implications of such projections have not been lost on Russian policymakers. Both in his first (2000-2008) and most recent (2012-present) terms as President, Vladimir Putin has linked Russia's demographic collapse to its national security. In his 2012 Presidential Address to the National Assembly, for instance, Putin claimed that unless Russia expanded its working age population "in just a few decades, Russia will become a poor, hopelessly aged (in the literal sense of the word) country, unable to preserve its independence and even its territory."⁵⁰ The territory most under threat lies in Russia's east, where depopulation has been particularly rapid, reserves of national resources are particularly robust, and a 2,600-mile border with a rising China worries Russia's leaders.⁵¹ Since the early 2000s the Russian state has developed a number of policy initiatives to address this problem, providing significant subsidies (known as "maternal capital") to mothers with two or more children, and promoting the "repatriation" of ethnic and cultural Russians in the former Soviet states.⁵² Putin

⁴⁸ Russia's demographic decline has been widely discussed. For a selection of sources, see Nicholas Eberstadt, "The Dying Bear: Russia's Demographic Disaster," *Foreign Affairs* 90:6 (November/December 2011): 95-108; Anatoly Vishnevsky, "The Challenge of Russia's Demographic Crisis," (IFRI Russia/NIS Center, June 2009), http://www.ifri.org/files/Russie/IFRI_demography_Vishnevsky_ENG_june2009.pdf; Nishnevsky, "Russia Facing Demographic Challenges," UN Human Development Report: Russian Federation (2008); Valery Yelizarov, *Demographic Policy in Russia: From Reflection to Action* (Moscow, United Nations in Russia, 2008), <http://www.unrussia.ru/en/un-in-russia/news/2008-04-30>.

⁴⁹ If UN projections are correct, there will be thirty-seven million fewer Russians in 2100 than there were in 1990.

⁵⁰ Putin, "Address to the Federal Assembly" (12 December 2012), <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4739>.

⁵¹ Russian leaders have been quite candid in voicing worries about Chinese immigration to the Russian east. In August of 2012, for instance, Dmitry Medvedev spoke of "objective of defending our Far Eastern territory from an excessive expansion of citizen from neighboring countries"; Putin has spoken in similar terms. See, for instance, Agence France-Press, "Russia Fears Chinese Immigration Threatens Its Far East" (10 August 2012), <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/246995/russia-fears-chinese-immigration-threatens-its-far-east>. For a report on Chinese agricultural migration into Russia, see Andrew Kramer, "Nation Rich in Land Draws Workers From One Rich in People," *New York Times* (10 September 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/business/global/in-russia-chinese-run-farms-solve-each-sides-needs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. For an argument that both China and Russia have suffered from too little Chinese migration, see Maria Repnikova and Harley Balzer, *Chinese Migration to Russia: Missed Opportunities* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009).

⁵² Putin's pro-family policy is regionally focused. In the 2012 Presidential Address, Putin describes subsidies to regions whose "demographic situation is worse than the national average," most of which are concentrated "in the Central, Northwestern, Volga, and Far Eastern federal districts." In the same speech, Putin defines "compatriots" as "those who are culturally and spiritually close to Russia," while stressing that "we will not allow the emergence of closed ethnic enclaves in Russia with their informal jurisdiction, existing outside the country's common legal and

has credited these policies with stemming Russia's demographic decline, but whether he is right to do so is still a matter of considerable dispute.⁵³

Russian demography also demonstrates deep divides among ethnic groups and generations. The Kremlin watches warily over Russia's Muslim population, particularly in the unstable arc of republics to Russia's south: Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia. Political radicalism and separatist sentiments in the region remain strong, in part because Moscow's harsh policies promote the very pathologies they are intended to eliminate. But the greatest immediate challenge may be the changing demographics of Russia's major cities. Young, better educated, and more affluent Russians, the products of economic modernization, are increasingly disenchanted with the authoritarian state capitalism that has taken shape under Putin since 2001. Although still relatively small in scope, the mass demonstrations against the regime that have occurred since 2011 may be harbingers of more destabilizing political unrest, particularly if the energy-fueled economy begins to decline.

How should Russia's looming demographic problems influence U.S. foreign policy? What role should Russia play in the U.S. "pivot" to Asia? Despite the past decade of economic growth (driven largely by natural resources), Russia's long land borders with China and a number of other nations might well heighten Russia's insecurity rather than its confidence. Might the "dying bear" (in demographer Nicholas Eberstadt's words) be one of the United States' greatest assets in its attempt to contain a rising dragon?

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Adomanis, Mark. "A Reply to Nicholas Eberstadt's 'The Dying Bear' – Russia's Demographics are Not Exceptional." *Forbes*. October 31, 2011.

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2011/10/31/a-reply-to-nicholas-eberstadts-the-dying-bear-russias-demographics-are-not-exceptional/> (accessed September 10, 2013).

cultural norms, and disdainfully disregarding the accepted standards, laws, and regulations." In an earlier article on the theme, Putin claimed that "the primary criterion for admitting anyone for residence and employment in Russia is the applicant's ability to embrace our culture and our values." See "Russia Historically Multinational – Putin Publishes Article on National Policy" (22 January 2012) and "Building Justice: A Social Policy for Russia" (13 February 2012), both available at: www.rt.com.

⁵³ In 2012 Putin noted that in 2012 Russia's birth rate exceeded the death rate "for the first time in our country's recent history." Putin's critics counter that recent upsurges in Russian fertility may simply be echoes of a mini-baby boom in the early-1980s. Critics also note that immigration is unlikely to increase Russia's population, since ethnic Russians wishing to repatriate may have already done so, while polls indicate far more young Russian would like to emigrate *from* Russia than ethnic Russians would like to immigrate *to* Russia. For a summary of these critiques of Putin's policy, see Fred Weir, "Putin Vows to Halt Russia's Population Plunge with Babies, Immigrants," *Christian Science Monitor* (14 February 2012). Available on-line: <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2012/0214/Putin-vows-to-halt-Russia-s-population-plunge-with-babies-immigrants>.

In a brief response to Nicholas Eberstadt's "The Dying Bear: Russia's Demographic Decline," Mark Adomanis claims that the Russian demographic numbers do not make it unique or less powerful than other comparable powers.

Akhmetkarimov, Bulat. "In Russia: Ambitions vs. Demography." *SAISPHERE*, 2010-2011: 12-15.

Akhmetkarimov offers an overview of Russian demographic trends and an analysis of the policy decisions facing President Vladimir Putin. The author also examines issues related to public health, migration and immigration policy, and whether Russia can remain "a competitive state."

Eberstadt, Nicholas. "The Dying Bear: Russia's Demographic Disaster." *Foreign Affairs*, 2011: 95-108.

Eberstadt outlines demographic trends in the Russian Federation since the fall of the Soviet Union, and describes these phenomena as unprecedented during peacetime for a highly developed nation. He further explores the possible effects of a diminishing population on social, economic, and military policy.

Putin, Vladimir V. *RT*. February 13, 2012. <http://rt.com/politics/official-word/putin-building-justice-russia-133/> (accessed September 14, 2013).

In one of many public addresses, Russian President Vladimir Putin outlines his plans and prospective policies designed to promote population growth, increase human capital, improve healthcare, and provide adequate housing.

United Nations. *UN Data*. 2013.

<http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Russian%20Federation> (accessed September 15, 2013).

This is the most recent demographic data for the Russian Federation, as collected by the United Nations. Data includes birth and death rates, population growth, and economic indicators.

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Agence France-Presse, "Russia Fears Chinese Immigration Threatens its Far East." Last modified August 10, 2012. Accessed September 14, 2013.

<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/246995/russia-fears-chinese-immigration-threatens-its-far-east>.

Heineman, Ben. "In Russia, a Demographic Crisis and Worries for Nation's Future." *The Atlantic*, October 11, 2011. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/10/in-russia-a-demographic-crisis-and-worries-for-nations-future/246277/> (accessed September 19, 2013).

Kapitsa, Sergei. Project Syndicate, "Russia's Population Implosion." Last modified June 29, 2005. Accessed September 19, 2013. <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russia-s-population-implosion>.

Kramer, Andrew. "Nation Rich in Land Draws Workers from One Rich in People." *New York Times*. Last modified September 10, 2012. Accessed September 19, 2013.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/business/global/in-russia-chinese-run-farms-solve-each-sides-needs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

Kucera, Joshua. *The Diplomat*, "China's Russian Invasion." Last modified February 19, 2010. Accessed September 19, 2013. <http://thediplomat.com/2010/02/19/china's-russian-invasion/?all=true>.

Mazurczak, Filip. "Averting a Demographic Nightmare in Russia and Eastern Europe." *New Eastern Europe*. (2013). <http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/834> (accessed September 19, 2013).

Repnikova, Maria, and Harley Balzer. "Chinese Migration to Russia – Missed Opportunities." *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Eurasian Papers*. (2009).

RiaNovosti, "Putin Approves Demographic Goals through 2025." Last modified November 10, 2007. Accessed September 19, 2013. <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20071011/83409080.html>.

"Russia's Demographic Challenge" Recorded December 3 2012. Stratfor. Web, <http://www.stratfor.com/video/russias-demographic-challenge>.

Weir, Fred. "Putin vows to Halt Russia's Population Plunge with Babies, Immigrants." *The Christian Science Monitor*. February 14, 2012.

<http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/World/2012/0214/Putin-vows-to-halt-Russia-s-population-plunge-with-babies-immigrants> (accessed September 15, 2013).

C. The Global Old

7. Old Europe: Muslim Migration and the Rebirth of the European Union

With a median age of forty and more individuals over sixty than under fifteen, Europe is the world's oldest region. And it is getting older fast. European fertility has not reached replacement since 1975, and the UN does not expect it to do so for the remainder of the century. As a result, the population of Europe is expected to shrink starting in 2020. In a number of European countries depopulation has already begun and is expected to accelerate.⁵⁴

European governments have attempted to repair this yawning demographic deficit in a number of ways. Like Russia, European states have subsidized childbirth and promoted immigration. In a number of cases these policies seem to have succeeded. In France, for instance, generous state support of mothers through direct payments, mandatory maternity leaves, and public childcare, have generated what some call *le baby boom*: France's highest fertility rates since the early 1970s.⁵⁵ Meanwhile, immigration has reduced European population loss considerably, while providing opportunities to workers from Eastern Europe and North Africa.

But these policies have also fallen short in important respects. French fertility has increased, for instance, but not (so far) above the replacement rate; in 2005-2010 the average Frenchwoman had 1.97 children. And the benefits of immigration have been questioned. Critics point out that immigration of workers from Eastern Europe, eased considerably by these countries' entry into the EU, has impeded these nations' development. As young workers went west, fertility across Eastern Europe declined to a shocking 1.3 children per woman from 1995 to 2005, and it has hardly risen since that time.⁵⁶ Immigration from North Africa and the Middle East, meanwhile, has generated a contentious debate over the cultural foundations of European states and whether Muslim immigrants in particular can (or should) become "European."⁵⁷ Floating above all of these concerns is the still-uncertain fate of the European Union. The most recent European fiscal crisis arose from excess government debt, which stemmed in part from

⁵⁴ On European demographics generally, see Iris Hoßmann et al., *Europe's Demographic Future: Growing Imbalances* (Berlin: The Berlin Institute for Population and Development, 2008), http://www.berlin-institut.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/Europa_e_Kurzfassung_sicher_o_B.pdf; Sarah Harper, "Aging Europe's Demographic Destiny: Framing the Challenges Ahead," *Current History* (March 2011): 117-21; Megan McCardle, "Europe's Real Crisis," *The Atlantic* (April 2012), <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/04/europes-real-crisis/308915/>.

⁵⁵ Tracy McNicoll, "France: Le Baby Boom," *Newsweek* (30 January 2011), <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/01/30/france-le-baby-boom.html>. Germany has recently followed France's policy lead, although it is too early to say whether *das baby boom* will follow.

⁵⁶ Total Fertility in Eastern Europe rose to 1.41 in 2005-2010.

⁵⁷ For an intelligent and provocative statement of the pessimistic case, see Christopher Caldwell, *Reflection on the Revolution in Europe* (New York: Doubleday, 2009).

member nations' support for their aging populations. These populations are not getting any younger.⁵⁸

U.S. policymakers have long recognized the benefits of a united and peaceful Europe. Do Europe's demographic trends reduce the importance of this goal, or increase it? What policy tools does the United States have to secure this outcome? How are security considerations – European contributions to NATO, for instance – likely to be influenced by Europe's demographic future? Would a proposed free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union significantly alleviate the economic crisis in Europe, allowing governments some breathing space to address long-term demographic problems?

Recommended Readings

Bloom, David, David Canning, and Jaypee Sevilla. *The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change*. Rand Corporation, 2003.

This report assesses general arguments about the effects of demographic change on economic growth, and examines demographic trends in other regions outside Europe. As such, it provides comparative context for analyses of European demographic considerations. It concludes that the “policy environment” is the key factor in managing population change.

Commission of the European Communities [European Commission]. “The Demographic Future of Europe – From Challenge to Opportunity,” Brussels, 12 October 2006, COM(2006) 571 final,

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0571:FIN:EN:PDF>

This is the official European Union policy document that acknowledges and attempts to address the demographic challenges cataloged in its own statistics. The paper identifies five key policy responses to manage demographic change: (1) Supporting demographic renewal through better conditions for families and improved reconciliation of working and family life; (2) Boosting employment – more jobs and longer working lives of better quality; (3) Raising productivity and economic performance through investing in education and research; (4) Receiving and integrating migrants into Europe; (5) Ensuring sustainable public finances to guarantee adequate pensions, health care, and long-term

⁵⁸ Future demographic developments are likely to strain the unity of Europe as the current power relations of member nations change significantly. If Eastern Europe continues to bleed workers to the West, for instance, these nations might replace the PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain) as the instigators of the next crisis – if, that is, the European Union survives the current crisis. And the disparate demographics of France and Germany portend a shift at the heart of the EU as well as its periphery. If current trends continue, France's population will pass Germany's in 2050; the demographic headwinds against German growth are stronger than those against France.

care. Additional details on the European Commission's internal demographic analysis are available from <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=502&langId=en>

European Union Center of North Carolina. "The EU's Demographic Crisis," EU Briefings, March 2008, <http://europe.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Brief9-0803-demographic-crisis.pdf>.

This briefing paper describes Europe's demographic situation in terms of and with reference to distinctly American ideas about fertility and population, highlighting the demographic divergence as a key area in which Europe and America differ from one another. The paper concludes that declining population will inevitably lead to lower standards of living.

Harper, Sarah. "Aging Europe's Demographic Destiny: Framing the Challenges Ahead," *Current History* (March 2011), 117-121.

Harper argues that many widely held assumptions about the implications of aging in Europe are myths, and that previous ways of looking at demographic challenges are outmoded. She still concludes that European demographics pose serious challenges and briefly summarizes the main approaches to thinking about and dealing with them.

Van de Kaa, Dirk J. "Europe's Second Demographic Transition." *Population Bulletin* 42, no. 1 (1987): n1.

Van de Kaa shows that Europe's present demographic trends have been long in coming. He identifies a shift in norms toward progressiveness and individualism, moving Europeans away from marriage and parenthood, as the source of declining fertility. Citing familiar arguments ageing as threats to national influence and the welfare state, Van de Kaa demonstrates that European governments (except France) have hesitated historically to establish politically risky and costly economic pro-natalist incentives. He argues, perhaps anachronistically given his pre-1989 perspective, that immigration is an unfeasible solution. Instead, he argues, "only measures compatible with the shift to individualism might slow or reverse the fertility decline, but a rebound to replacement level seems unlikely and long-term population decline appears inevitable for most of Europe."

Additional Readings

Economist. "Europe's Other Crisis: Recession is bringing Europe's brief fertility rally to a shuddering halt," 30 June 2012, <http://www.economist.com/node/21557774>

European Commission. Directorate-General for Economic, and Economic Policy Committee of the European Communities. *The Impact of Ageing on Public Expenditure: Projections for the EU-25 Member States on pensions, healthcare, long-term care, education and unemployment transfers (2004-50)*. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2006.

Goldstone, Jack A. "The New Population Bomb: The Four Megatrends that Will Change the World," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 89, No. 31 (2010).

Kotkin, Joel. "What's Really Behind Europe's Decline? It's The Birth Rates, Stupid," *Forbes*, 30 May 2012, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2012/05/30/whats-really-behind-europes-decline-its-the-birth-rates-stupid/>

Lesthaeghe, Ron. "A Century of Demographic and Cultural Change in Western Europe: An Exploration of Underlying Dimensions," *Population and Development Review* Vol. 9, No. 3 (Sep., 1983), pp. 411-435.

Marquardt, Felix. "The Best Hope for France's Young? Get Out", *New York Times*, 29 June 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/opinion/sunday/the-best-hope-for-frances-young-get-out.html?smid=pl-share>

Mazurczak, Filip. "Averting a Demographic Nightmare in Russia and Eastern Europe," *New Eastern Europe*, 02 June 2013, <http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/834>

Pison, Gilles. "France and Germany: A history of criss-crossing demographic curves," *Population & Societies* [Monthly Bulletin of the French National Institute of Demographic Studies] No. 487 (March 2012), http://www.ined.fr/fichier/t_publication/1585/publi_pdf2_pesa487.pdf

8. Pensions and Palliative Care: Austerity, the Welfare State, and Population Flows in North America

The United States has long been a demographic outlier among industrialized nations, largely because of immigration.⁵⁹ The Pew Center projects that immigrants to the United States between 2005 and 2011 will account for 82 percent of U.S. population growth by 2050; by that time, the United States will have become a “majority minority” nation.⁶⁰ European depopulation, by contrast, is so firmly entrenched that even a radical increase in immigration is not likely to reverse it.

If the long-term demographic prospects of the United States look favorable relative to Europe, however, the aging of the U.S. population nevertheless presents a serious challenge to U.S. policymakers. In 1950 only eight percent of the U.S. population was older than 65; in 2010, thirteen percent were; in 2050, twenty-one percent are projected to be. This increase in the number of elderly dependents will place considerable strain on Medicare and Social Security, as they are currently designed. U.S. policymakers could mitigate this increase (as Russia and European governments have attempted) by supporting childbirth or by increasing immigration. There is room for policy innovation in both areas. Compared to its industrialized peers, the United States has been remarkably unconcerned with promoting childbirth; aside from a modest tax credit U.S. parents receive little direct state subsidization.⁶¹ Illegal immigration to the United

⁵⁹ U.S. and European fertility rates were similar in the 1970s, but since that time U.S. fertility has risen – to just below replacement in 2005-2010 – while European fertility has continued to fall. But immigrants contribute significantly to fertility in both cases. In the United States, the average Hispanic woman had 2.82 children in 2004, while non-Hispanic whites had only 1.85; in Europe, by comparison, the average Muslim woman had 2.2 children, while the average non-Muslim had 1.5 children. Hispanics represent a greater percentage of the US population than Muslims do of in most European populations nations. Also, a substantial portion of European immigration originates from the low-fertility countries of Eastern Europe, whereas immigrants to the United States originate disproportionately in the high-fertility regions of central and south America. See Nicholas Eberstadt, “Born in the USA: America’s Demographic Exceptionalism,” *The American Interest* (May/June 2007): 52-8. For data on the fertility of European Muslims, see the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, “The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010-2030” (27 January 2011), <http://www.pewforum.org/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-europe.aspx>.

⁶⁰ Jeffrey Passel, Gretchen Livingston, and D’Vera Cohn, “Explaining Why Minority Births Now Outnumber White Births,” Pew Research Social and Demographic Trends (17 May 2012), <http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/05/17/explaining-why-minority-births-now-outnumber-white-births/>. Also see Stephanie Czekalinski, “U.S. Birth Rate Hits Record Low,” *National Journal* (29 November 2012), <http://www.nationaljournal.com/thenextamerica/demographics/u-s-birth-rate-hits-record-low-20121129>; Sabrina Tavernise, “Whites Account for Under Half of Births in U.S.,” *New York Times* (17 May 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/us/whites-account-for-under-half-of-births-in-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

⁶¹ For comparative studies of national fertility policies, see Filip Mazurczak, “Averting a Demographic Nightmare in Russia and Eastern Europe” (2 June 2013), *New Eastern Europe* (2 June 2013), <http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/834>; and Rachel Henneck, “Family Policy in the US, Japan, Germany, Italy and France: Parental Leave, Child Benefits/Family Allowances, Child Care, Marriage/Cohabitation, and Divorce,” *Council on Contemporary Families* (May 2003), <http://www.contemporaryfamilies.org/work-family/fampolicy.html>. Robert Stein argues that the U.S. tax code can be made considerably more favorable towards childbirth than it is at present; see Stein, “Taxes and the Family,” *National Affairs* (Winter 2010): 35-48, <http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/taxes-and-the-family>.

States has flagged as Mexico's fertility rate has fallen and its economy has grown; as the character of U.S. immigration changes, efforts to expand *legal* immigration are likely to grow less politically challenging.⁶² Apart from fertility and immigration policy, there is also an opportunity to redesign the United States' systems of support for the elderly by raising the retirement age, means testing, or lowering benefits (among other options). Maintaining both relatively low government spending and constant entitlements, however, will be difficult.

How should U.S. policymakers respond to the aging of American society? What is the right balance between state support for childbirth, immigration, and other social policy reforms? How does the United States' democratic regime foster or hinder policy innovation in this area?

Recommended Readings

Diamond, Peter. "Social Security," *American Economic Review*, 94(1) (2004): 1-24.

Diamond discusses the positive aspects of the United States Social Security System. He explains how social security is set up and how the system helps ensure that individuals will have savings at retirement for both themselves and their children.

Fichtner, Jason J. "Reforming Social Security to Better Promote Retirement Security" (Testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means. May 23, 2013). Accessed September 16, 2013, <http://mercatus.org/publication/reforming-social-security-better-promote-retirement-security>

Jason Fichtner discusses the main themes surrounding social security benefits: when people use them, the negative incentives on work, and adjustments that could be made to improve social security.

Lee, Ronald, and Timothy Miller. "Immigration, Social Security, and Broader Fiscal Impacts," *American Economic Review* 90(2) (2000): 350-354.

⁶² Mexican fertility has fallen significantly in the last forty years – from over six children per woman in the early 1970s, to 2.37 today – and economic opportunity in Mexico has expanded as the Mexican economy has rebounded from its 2009 contraction. See Julia Preston, "Mexican Immigration to U.S. Slowed Significantly, Report Says," *New York Times* (23 April 2012), <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/us/mexican-immigration-to-united-states-slows.html>; and Philip E. Wolgin and Ann Garcia, "What Changes in Mexico Mean for U.S. Immigration Policy," *Center for American Progress* (8 August 2011), <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2011/08/08/10203/what-changes-in-mexico-mean-for-u-s-immigration-policy/>. Reports in 2012 noted that Asians had surpassed Hispanics as the largest group of immigrants to the United States. See Kirk Semple, "In a Shift, Biggest Wave of Migrants Is Now Asian," *New York Times* (18 June 2012), <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/19/us/asians-surpass-hispanics-as-biggest-immigrant-wave.html>.

Lee and Miller examine the impact of immigration on taxes and social security benefits. Overall the effects are very small. Those living in states with high immigrant populations pay more (for education and other local benefits), while those living in states with fewer immigrants have fewer costs (lower tax rates) but receive greater federal benefits.

Liebman, Jeffrey B. and Erzo F.P. Luttmer, "Would People Behave Differently if They Better Understood Social Security? Evidence from a Field Experiment," NBER Working Paper No. 17287 (2011). Accessed September 17, 2013. doi: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w17287>.

Liebman and Luttmer perform a field experiment to test whether individuals would change their behavior if they better understood the social security system. They suggest that better understanding social security affects the labor supply decisions of individuals, especially for women.

Maestas, Nicole, and Julie Zissimopoulos, "How Longer Work Lives Ease the Crunch of Population Aging," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 24 (1) (2010): 139-160.

Maestas and Zissimopoulos put a positive spin on the social security problem. They project changes in the labor force participation rate of older populations, arguing that technology changes and shifts to skilled labor are important factors leading to older generations working more.

Additional Readings

Aguila, Emma, "Personal Retirement Accounts and Saving," *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 3(4) (2011): 1-24.

Barr, Nicholas. "The Pension Puzzle: Prerequisites and Policy Choices in Pension Design," The International Monetary Fund. (2002). Accessed September 16, 2013, <http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/issues/issues29/index.htm>

Coile, Courtney, and Jonathan Gruber, "Future Social Security Entitlements and the Retirement Decision," *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 89 (2) (2007): 234-246.

Golosov, Mikhail, Ali Shourideh, Maxim Troshkin, and Aleh Tsyvinski, "Optimal Pension Systems with Simple Instruments" *American Economic Review*, 103(3) (2013): 502-07.

Hernæs, Erik, Marte Sollie, and Steinar Strøm, "Early Retirement and Economic Incentives," *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 102 (3), Social Security in the 21st Century (2000): 481-502.

Holzmann, Robert, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, *New Ideas about Old Age Security: Toward Sustainable Pension Systems in the 21st Century*. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, 2001.

Lacomba, Juan A., and Francisco Lagos, "Population Aging and Legal Retirement Age," *Journal of Population Economics* (19) (3) (2006): 507-519.

Lusardi, Anamaria, and Olivia S. Mitchell, "Baby Boomer Retirement Security: The Roles of Planning, Financial Literacy, and Housing Wealth." *Journal of Monetary Economics*. 54 (1) (2007): 205-224.

Razin, Assaf, Efraim Sadka, and Phillip Swagel. "The Aging Population and the Size of the Welfare State," *Journal of Political Economy* 110 (4) (2002): 900-918.

"Social Security Benefit Amounts." Social Security Administration, accessed September 17, 2013, <http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/Benefits.html>.

Suen, Wing. "Retirement Patterns in Hong Kong: A Censored Regression Analysis," *Journal of Population Economics* 10 (4) (1997): 443-461.

II. Topics in Demography

The pattern traced by theorists of the demographic transition – population growth followed by a drop in fertility, a demographic dividend followed by a deficit, and finally a return to a stable replacement level of fertility – originated in careful study of European nations' modernization. But as the market economy has brought nations into the orbit of the industrialized world, the demographic transition has spread beyond Europe. At present, so many nations have been caught up in economic globalization that it is no longer accurate to speak only of *national* transitions. The world is experiencing a demographic transition of its own.

The global demographic transition began around 1900, when the world's life expectancy started to increase.⁶³ By the late 1960s global population was growing at over two percent each year, a pace which would lead it to double every thirty-five years. And then fertility fell. It has continued to fall from five children per woman in the 1950s to today's global rate of 2.5 children per woman. If UN predications hold true global fertility will decline further still, reaching the replacement rate sometime in the 2070s. As the world enjoyed its "demographic dividend" the size of the global economy quintupled. In demographics, however, every dividend is followed by a deficit.⁶⁴ And this prospect raises an important question: Will global growth continue as humanity enters into its dotage?

⁶³ In the first half of the twentieth century, life expectancy rose from thirty to forty-six; in 2010 it stood at sixty-nine. Within the span of a single human life, life's duration for all humans had more than doubled. During the same period, infant mortality plummeted while global fertility hovered far above replacement, at about five children per woman. Infant mortality fell by 69% in the latter half of the twentieth century alone.

⁶⁴ In 1965, the world's old-age dependency ratio, a measure of the ratio of the old (over 65) to the working age (15-64) was 9; in 2010, it was 11.7; by 2050 it is projected to reach 24.7. For a present day analogy, 9 is approximately the old age dependency ratio of Central America (9.2); 24.7 is approximately the old age dependency ratio of present day Europe (23.9).

A. The Demographics of Economic Growth

9. Where Have All the Dollars Gone? Currency Flows, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the Global Economy

Individuals normally borrow when they are young, save as they work, then live off of their savings after retirement. Nations, if they are fiscally responsible, do something similar, using foreign investment and aid to increase the productivity of their economies, then saving as their economies grow so that when economic growth stalls (as it does when populations age) they are able to cushion the blow.⁶⁵ Rates of national savings are particularly high when the number of elderly dependents is low relative to the working age population.⁶⁶ Global savings have remained fairly constant for the past thirty years between 20 and 24%. Deploying these savings profitably in the face of declining population growth, however, will require considerable ingenuity. In part, the as-yet undeveloped stretches of the world – particularly those on the favorable front-end of demographic transition – will be able to put capital to good use. The nations of Africa (e.g., Nigeria) are for this reason an attractive medium-term target for foreign investment. But even Nigeria will age in the not too distant future.⁶⁷ As a result, returns on investment will flow to those who spot opportunities for rapid gains in productivity, as distinct from opportunities for population-driven economic growth. But such gains are considerably more difficult to anticipate than demographic trends.

It is partly for this reason that developing nations have started to act the part of investment houses and to deploy their foreign reserves (the foreign currency collected by running trade surpluses) via sovereign wealth funds.⁶⁸ The returns on these funds have occasionally been quite strong; nevertheless, in many cases sovereign wealth funds allowed national wealth (i.e.,

⁶⁵ China provides a case in point. As Chinese workers reaped their demographic dividend household saving skyrocketed, reaching a towering peak of 38% in 2010. For background see Keith Richburg, “Getting Chinese to Stop Saving and Start Spending is a Hard Sell,” *Washington Post* (5 July 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-07-05/world/35488534_1_savings-rate-chinese-consumers-china-market-research-group.

⁶⁶ Since retirees no longer earn, they contribute to national consumption rather than saving. On the balance of saving and consumption over an individual’s (and a nation’s) life, see in particular the work of Franco Modigliani. Angus Deaton provides a helpful introduction in “Franco Modigliani and the Life Cycle Theory of Consumption,” paper presented at the Research Program in Development Studies and Center for Health and Wellbeing, Princeton University (March 2005), <http://www.princeton.edu/~deaton/downloads/romelecture.pdf>. Modigliani considers the case of China in Modigliani and Shi Larry Cao, “The Chinese Saving Puzzle and the Life-Cycle Hypothesis,” *Journal of Economic Literature* 42:1 (March 2004): 145-70.

⁶⁷ The UN projects Nigeria old age dependency ratio to climb starting in 2035 and its fertility rate to reach replacement just after the close of the century.

⁶⁸ For background on the rise of sovereign wealth funds, see Simon Johnson, “The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds,” *Finance and Development* (September 2007): 56-7, <http://www.imf.org/EXTERNAL/PUBS/FT/FANDD/2007/09/straight.htm>; Edwin M. Truman, “A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Fund Best Practices,” *Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief* (April 2008), <http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb08-3.pdf>.

citizens' savings) to assume a speculative character.⁶⁹ Thus sovereign wealth funds give rise to a number of questions, most of which have to do with their ambivalent identity.

How should developing nations cope with global ageing? Are sovereign wealth funds tools of national policy or merely investment mechanisms? Should U.S. policymakers worry when potential American adversaries use their sovereign wealth funds to purchase large stakes in U.S. corporations? Or should policymakers welcome such ventures as means for foreign nations to grow invested in the success of the U.S. economy? Does foreign investment tie authoritarian nations into a global capitalist system which may, over time, generate greater economic transparency and accountability? How should U.S. policy reflect the influence of demography on the international economy?

Recommended Readings

Bremmer, Ian. *The End of the Free Market*. New York: Penguin Group, 2010.

This source concisely describes “state capitalism,” identifying its characteristics and the tools used by various state-capitalist governments. Bremmer provides different country case study examples, showing examples of privately owned ‘national champion’ firms, many enabled by liquidity from sovereign wealth funds. This is the best work to define sovereign wealth funds, as it provides clear and diverse examples of these funds and shows their likely effects.

Fotak, Veljko, Bernardo Bortolotti, and William Megginson. “The Financial Impact of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments in Listed Companies.” Norman, OK: Price College of Business, University of Oklahoma, 18 September 2008. Accessible at <http://www.gresicetai.hec.ca/cref/sem/documents/081107.pdf>.

This source empirically examines different sovereign wealth funds from countries around the world and predicts, based on their past and current earnings, whether they will prove fiscally sound in the future. The study notes that these funds have sometimes offered much higher yields than normal investments, although the risk can be equally great. Fotak et al. note that most of these firms are composed of a minority share of various international assets, but rarely do they hold a majority share. This article also allows one to quantify the success of several states' funds.

Klein, Ezra. “Five Facts you Need to Know about China’s Currency Manipulation” in

⁶⁹ A number of sovereign wealth funds came under considerable scrutiny during the most recent financial crisis, for instance, as several took large losses.

Wonkblog. *The Washington Post*, 22 October 2012. Accessible at:

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/10/22/five-facts-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-currency-manipulation/>

This short blog post highlights the second- and third-order effects of China's currency manipulation, in which it accumulates U.S. dollars to keep its own currency depreciated while encouraging its export-heavy industry. Klein counters arguments that currency manipulation limits U.S. options, noting that we could always depreciate our currency on our own or call out all other countries that are currently manipulating their currencies relative to the U.S. dollar. In recent years China has started to comply with requests to allow their currency to slowly appreciate.

Krugman, Paul. "Taking on China" in *New York Times*, 15 March 2010.

Krugman discusses China's manipulation of its currency – its undervaluing, or depreciating, the renminbi – in order to be more competitive with the U.S. dollar and the currencies of other trading partners. In doing so, China projects an economic policy focused on exports and import-competing goods, in order to maintain a positive trade surplus. Krugman recommends that the U.S. Treasury Department stop ignoring China's policy of hoarding U.S. dollars and foreign assets. He notes that the United States has leverage because should China try to cash in its U.S. assets, the assets would become worthless and goods in the United States would become more competitive, albeit due to the depreciation of the U.S. dollar.

Truman, Edwin M. "A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Fund Best Practices," Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief Number PB08-3, April 2008.

This source discusses different 'best practices' for the healthy use of sovereign wealth funds in order to enhance global economies, rather than to increase instability. The policy brief puts these funds into context and then creates a blue print of recommended best practices, including evaluative criteria to determine whether a particular fund is helpful or hurtful for long-run growth.

Additional Readings

Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*. New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2012.

Bloom, David E., David Canning, and Jaypee Sevilla. *The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003.

Deaton, Angus. "Franco Modigliani and the Life Cycle Theory of Consumption." Research Program in Development Studies and Center for Health and Wellbeing, Princeton University, March 2005.

Jory, Surendranath R., Mark J. Perry, and Thomas A. Hemphill. "The Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds in Global Financial Intermediation." University of Michigan Flint, Wiley Publications, Inc., 2010. Accessible at:
<http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/78242/20381 ftp.pdf?sequence=1>.

Miracky, William, Davis Dyer, Drosten Fisher, Tony Goldner, Loic Lagarde, and Vicente Piedrahita. *Assessing the Risks: The Behaviors of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Global Economy*. Monitor Group, 2008.

Modigliani, Franco. "Life Cycle, Individual Thrift, and the Wealth of Nations," Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences Lecture, 1985.

Modigliani, Franco and Shi Larry Cao. "The Chinese Saving Puzzle and the Life-Cycle Hypothesis" in *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. XLII, March 2004.

10. *Women and Wealth: The Role of Gender in Global Development*

The entry of women into the workforce has been perhaps the most significant economic and demographic event of the past half-century. The percentage of women in the U.S. workforce has increased from thirty percent in 1930 to near sixty percent in 2010; globally, more than half of women work.⁷⁰ No advanced economy has maintained substantial gender inequality. Indeed, gender equality increasingly seems synonymous with development itself.

Women's entry into the work force has coincided with more intensive human capital investments, in women themselves and in their children. Girls' access to education, for instance, has improved markedly across the globe – with considerable positive externalities.⁷¹ A study in Pakistan found that children's time studying and test scores correlated to maternal education; women's education has also been linked to higher immunization rates and improved childhood nutrition.⁷² Because women's labor force participation still trails men's by about 25%, it is possible that greater involvement of women in the work force will be of particular value in regions facing depopulation.⁷³ Inclusion of women allows nations to expand their working population without increasing the number of dependents.

However, greater inclusion of women also raises a number of policy challenges. As women enter the classroom and the workplace, they have fewer children, which has the long-term effect of generating demographic deficits.⁷⁴ It is as yet unclear whether government policies can sustain replacement or above-replacement fertility while maintaining women's

⁷⁰ For data on U.S. women in the work force, see the Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Labor Force Statistics From the Current Population Survey," <http://www.bls.gov/cps/demographics.htm#women>. For global data see United Nations, *The World's Women 2010: Trends and Statistics* (New York: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2010).

⁷¹ At the primary level, the education of girls is nearly universal; only 58% of girls attend secondary school, but apart from Middle and Western Africa boys attend at roughly the same rate. In tertiary education, girls outnumber boys, accounting for 51% of total enrollment. Each of these educational indicators has grown more equitable over the past twenty years. These data are drawn from the United Nations' *The World's Women 2010*.

⁷² See Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, and Asim Ijaz Khwaja, "Students Today, Teachers Tomorrow? Identifying Constraints on the Provision of Education," Policy Research Working Paper (Washington, DC: The World Bank Development Research Group, June 2011), <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/docserver/download/5674.pdf?expires=1373851116&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=D9B3ECA06F134974E757CAEABC72EC4D>. For discussion of this and similar studies see the World Bank's *World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2011), p. 5.

⁷³ For this argument, see the World Bank, *World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development*, p. 5. "In countries and regions with rapidly aging populations, like China and Europe and Central Asia," says this report, "encouraging women to enter and remain in the labor force can help dampen the adverse impact of shrinking working-age populations."

⁷⁴ For critiques of alarmism on this point, see Philip Cohen, "Let's Not Panic Over Women with More Education Having Fewer Children," *The Atlantic* (12 February 2013), <http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/02/lets-not-panic-over-women-with-more-education-having-fewer-kids/273070/>; and Nancy Folbre, "The Underpopulation Bomb," *Economix Blog, New York Times* (11 February 2013), <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/the-underpopulation-bomb/>.

economic gains.⁷⁵ As of 2009 forty-three nations have made the attempt, enacting policies intended to raise fertility levels mainly by reconciling childbirth and work.⁷⁶ More vexing even than these policy difficulties are the philosophical challenges that arise when advanced democracies promote women's rights as an element of development aid. On the one hand, commitments to human rights, equality, and economic liberalization lead states and non-governmental organizations to promote drastic reforms in developing nations which afford inferior opportunities to women; on the other hand, commitments to cultural pluralism – that is, to the principle of toleration and even respect for cultural difference when deeply held beliefs and traditions contradict one another – mitigate against these very same reforms. There is a tension, in short, between liberalism and multiculturalism on the plane of theory, and thus an impasse in the practical matter of designing effective development aid that reflects respect for its recipients' culture.⁷⁷

The harshly limited economic prospects of peasant women, forced to bear a disproportionate burden in staving off destitution, deepen this tension. How, then, should U.S. policy towards the developing world reflect women's central role in economic development? How can industrialized nations facing demographic deficits ease the burdens of combining work and family? Can public policy remedy low fertility? How should advanced democracies balance the principles of liberalism and multiculturalism?

Recommended Readings

Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Esther Duflo. *Poor Economics*. United States: PublicAffairs, 2011.

Instead of making wide-sweeping conclusions regarding poverty, Banerjee and Duflo attempt to make targeted recommendations on how to eradicate poverty and improve the lives of the poor. Using a series of case studies and conclusions from prominent economists and social scientists across the spectrum of beliefs on the efficacy of aid, they conclude that small changes can have big effects on the eradication of poverty.

⁷⁵ See John C. Caldwell and Thomas Schindlmayr, "Explanations of the Fertility Crisis in Modern Societies: A Search for Commonalities," *Population Studies* 57:3 (November 2003): 241-63. Also see Eric Kaufmann, *Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?* (London: Profile Books, 2010), p. 55. Several demographers suggest that fertility has more to do with desired fertility level or culture than economic considerations in and of themselves. See for instance, Lant H. Pritchett, "Desired Fertility and the Impact of Population Policies," *Population and Development Review*, 20:1 (March 1994): 1-55; and John C. Caldwell, "Toward A Restatement of Demographic Transition Theory," *Population and Development Review* 2:3/4 (September/December 1976): 321-66. In evaluating alternative policies, one must consider the causal variables linked to fertility and the ability of governmental policy to influence them.

⁷⁶ UN, *World Population Policies 2009 Database*, <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2009/WPPdownload.htm>. For a discussion of earlier data, see Leslie King, "Demographic Trends, Pronatalism, and Nationalist Ideologies in the Late Twentieth Century," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25:3 (May 2002): 367-89.

⁷⁷ For a primer on the debate, see Susan Moller Okin, *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

Cohen, Philip. "Let's Not Panic Over Women with More Education Having Fewer Kids." *The Atlantic*, Feb 12, 2013. Accessed September 15, 2013.

<http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/02/lets-not-panic-over-women-with-more-education-having-fewer-kids/273070/>

There is an inverse relationship between education and fertility. This article compares gender inequality with fertility rates and concludes that it is possible to remedy gender inequality issues only after fertility rates are lowered. Cohen argues that there are potential benefits of low fertility rate in a developed nation.

Groots International and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). "Leading Resilient Development" (2011): 1-25. Accessed September 15, 2011.

http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/womensempowerment/leading-resilient-development---grassroots-women-priorities-practices-and-innovations/f2_GROOTS_Web.pdf

This joint effort of UNDP and several Nongovernmental Organizations aims to show how "grassroots women" (defined as low-income and poor women living in economically, socially, and politically marginalized communities) who are more resilient to disaster and climate change are linked to advancing development. The report is unique because it ties these development initiatives to policy discussion about disaster risk reduction. It also advocates using grassroots women in leadership roles within their communities to minimize fallout from disasters and increase resiliency, therefore helping to eradicate poverty.

Kristof, Nicholas D. and Sheryl Wudunn. *Half the Sky*. New York, A. Knopf, 2009.

This book discusses the oppression of women in the developing world using several case studies to highlight how economies are better off when women are empowered. It offers encouraging evidence supporting microfinance/microloans, women's education programs, and women's empowerment initiatives as means to improve overall economic conditions and fight poverty.

Okin, Susan Moller. "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" In *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?*, ed. Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C. Nassbaum, 1-17. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1999.

As part of a collection of essays, Susan Okin posits that the subjugation of women is standard practice in various parts of the world. When developing policies regarding other

nations, we must ask if the demands for multiculturalism increase the likelihood of the continuation and spread of these discriminatory practices to liberal democracies. There are several case studies contained in her work that support this possibility. Do liberalism and multiculturalism contradict each other?

Additional Readings

The Acumen Fund. Available on-line: <http://acumen.org>.

Bureau of Labor Supply (BLS) Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey. Available on-line: <http://www.bls.gov/cps/demographics.htm#women>.

Easterly, William. *The Elusive Quest for Growth*. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 2001.

Half the Sky Movement. Available on-line: <http://www.halftheskymovement.org/>

Karlan, Dean and Jacob Appel. *More than Good Intentions*, New York, NY, Penguin Group, 2011.

King, Leslie. "Demographic Trends, Pronatalism, and Nationalist Ideologies in the Late Twentieth Century," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25:3 (May 2002): 367-89.

Novogratz, Jacqueline. *The Blue Sweater*. New York, NY, Rodale, 2009.

Sen, Amartya, "More Than 100 Million Women are Missing." *The New York Review of Books*. Accessed on September 5, 2013. <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1990/dec/20/more-than-100-million-women-are-missing/?pagination=false>

United Nations Development Program. Available on-line: www.undp.com.

United Nations, *World Population Policies 2009 Database*. Available on-line: <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2009/WPPdownload.htm>.

United Nations, Gender Inequality Index. Available on-line: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/gii/>.

The World Bank's *World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development*. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2011.

The World Bank. Available on-line: www.worldbank.org/en/topic/gender.

B. The Demographics of Population Growth

11. *The Omnivore's Security Dilemma: The International Politics of Food and Water*

In predicting that increases in human population would always outpace the rate of innovation, Thomas Malthus famously failed to anticipate a dramatic surge in food productivity.⁷⁸ There is, however, no guarantee that food productivity will keep up with the 57% increase in global population that the UN predicts by 2100. In fact, the price of grain more than doubled between 2003 and 2009 and has remained at a high level as demand has continued to exceed supply.⁷⁹ For individuals in advanced countries such price increases are hardly catastrophic, since food takes up a tiny portion of household budget.⁸⁰ In developing countries, however, households are considerably more vulnerable. The average Kenyan household, for instance, spends forty-five percent of its budget on food, whereas the average American household devotes 11% of its budget (7% excluding restaurants) to food and has not spent forty percent for over a century.⁸¹ Volatility in food prices strains budgets in the developing world in a manner that is hard for those in the developed world to comprehend.

Food insecurity can have profound strategic implications. Scholars argue that spikes in food prices contributed to the Arab Spring.⁸² Across the developing world, climate change is likely to make food and water supplies increasingly difficult to predict, while increasing the power of those who produce or control these resources. Turkey's control of the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates, for instance, will give it leverage over Middle Eastern affairs in proportion to the scarcity of water.⁸³ In the developing world, states and non-state actors that can effectively supply food and water during crises will enjoy considerable power.

⁷⁸ Gregory Clark notes that “there is, in fact, nothing inherently *industrial* about the Industrial Revolution. Since 1800 the productivity of agriculture has increased by as much as that of the rest of the economy, and without these gains in agriculture modern growth would have been impossible.” See Clark, *A Farewell to Alms* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 193. Since Malthus wrote in 1798, food productivity has continued to grow dramatically, more than doubling since 1950 alone.

⁷⁹ For grain prices, see Janet Larsen, “Global Grain Stocks Drop Dangerously Low as 2012 Consumption Exceeded Production,” *Eco-Economy Indicators: Grain Harvest* (17 January 2013), <http://www.earth-policy.org/indicators/C54>. Note, however, that the price of food is still lower today than in 1960. For data on food prices, see the World Bank's Commodity Market Monitor, <http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21574907~menuPK:7859231~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html>.

⁸⁰ For a summary, see Derek Thompson, “In America, Food is Getting Cheaper... Unless You're Poor,” *The Atlantic* (8 March 2013), <http://www.theatlanticcities.com/politics/2013/03/america-food-getting-cheaper-unless-youre-poor/4923/>.

⁸¹ See the data collected by Thompson, “In America, Food is Getting Cheaper... Unless You're Poor,” *The Atlantic* (8 March 2013).

⁸² See Andrew Holland, “The Arab Spring and World Food Prices,” American Security Project: Climate Security (November 2012), <http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Ref-0096-The-Arab-Spring-and-World-Food-Prices.pdf>; and “Food and the Arab Spring: Let Them Eat Baklava,” *The Economist* (17 March 2012), <http://www.economist.com/node/21550328>.

⁸³ See Robert Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography* (New York: Random House, 2012), p. 285-6.

The world's food supply is also an important global health issue, one which is likely to grow in salience as the global population ages and health costs increase. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization reported in 2013 that 868 million people were undernourished, while 1.5 billion were overweight.⁸⁴ Undernourishment has declined significantly in recent history, from 18.6% of the world's population in 1990 to the present 12.5%; however, the percentage of *obese* individuals has doubled since 1980.⁸⁵ States that succeed in reducing this “double burden of malnutrition” – undernourishment and excessive weight – will enjoy significant and strategically relevant gains in economic productivity.⁸⁶

What can U.S. policymakers do to ease food and water insecurity in the developing world? How will climate change alter the global balance of food power – which nations will produce more and which less? How might the markets for food and water interact with markets for other scarce, strategic resources like oil? Is there good reason to think that climate change, by making food and water more scarce, might finally prove Malthus right?

Recommended Readings

Office of Director of National Intelligence: United States of America. “Global Water Security: An Intelligence Community Assessment.” 2012. Accessed September 20, 2013. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Special%20Report_ICA%20Global%20Water%20Security.pdf

This report—requested by the Department of State—is designed to answer the question: How will water problems (shortages, poor water quality, or floods) impact U.S. national security interests over the next thirty years? The authors assess that over the next ten years many countries important to the United States will experience water problems that will risk instability, state failure, increased regional tension, and distract them from working with the United States on important policy objectives. Between now and 2040 water issues will hinder the ability of countries to produce food and generate energy, posing a risk to global food markets and hobbling economic growth. As a result of these resource challenges and related demographic pressures North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia will face major challenges in coping with reductions in water supply.

⁸⁴ United Nations, *The State of Food and Agriculture: Food Systems for Better Nutrition* (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2013), <http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3300e/i3300e00.htm>.

⁸⁵ Data on undernourishment can be found in United Nations, *The State of Food Insecurity in the World* (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2013), p. 9, <http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3027e/i3027e00.htm>. Data on obesity comes from United Nations, United Nations, *The State of Food and Agriculture* (2013), p. 15. Note that recently in the United States there are some preliminary positive data on obesity; see, for instance, Samuel Adams and Mary Camille Izlar, “Obesity Rate Falls Among Poor Children Signaling Reversal,” *Bloomberg News* (7 August 2013), <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-06/obesity-rate-may-decrease-among-poor-children-cdc-say.html>.

⁸⁶ The UN estimates the total economic cost of undernourishment to be \$3.5 trillion, while the cumulative cost of non-communicable disease, for which excessive weight is a risk factor, is about \$1.4 trillion.

Webb, Patrick. "Medium-to Long-Run Implications of High Food Prices for Global Nutrition." *The Journal of Nutrition*. November 18, 2009. Accessed September 20, 2013. <http://jn.nutrition.org/content/140/1/143S.short>.

The combined food, fuel, and financial crises of 2007–2009 had severe and widespread negative impacts around the world. Two key question challenging governments were: How long would the high prices last and with what effects on food security and nutrition over the longer run? This paper considers the drivers of the crisis and explores if, unlike past shocks, recent food price increases reflect structural changes in food price formation that will have lasting global implications. New cross-commodity relationships allowed prices to spike, although there was no shortage of food at the global level nor indeed a significant downturn in recent yields. The gap between supply and need was underpinned by growing urban demand, consumption of processed and higher-value foods (including meat), biofuel policy, and purchasing power erosion, but also by short-term market-distorting policies implemented by governments responding to perceived shortages of food. Thus, the impact of future food price crises will depend largely on what policymakers chose to do in response to the peaks and what they do not do during the troughs. Appropriate investments are urgently needed not just in smallholder developing country agriculture, but in effective food policies and targeted programming that can reverse the recent negative trends in nutrition and that support access globally to improved diet quality as well as food quantity.

Sen, Amartya, "Food, Economics, and Entitlements." Helsinki, Wider Working Paper 1. http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/previous/en_GB/wp-01/

Putting the problem of acquiring food at the heart of hunger and starvation issues, Sen argues that the "entitlement approach" can provide a general perspective for analyzing hunger and food policy requirements. To lower the degree of vulnerability to famine and starvation, this paper raises a number of short-run issues such as famine anticipation, famine relief (food distribution vs. cash relief), and the role of food supply and food prices in famine. Sen also some long-term policy concerns such as enhancing, securing, and guaranteeing entitlements, and diversification of production patterns.

Pardey, Philip G. & Nienke M. Beintema. "Slow Magic – Agricultural Research A Century after Mendel" International Food Policy Research Institute, 2001, 36 pages. Download from: <http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/fpr31.pdf>

The miracle of the past four decades is that today's farmers are feeding almost twice as many people far better from virtually the same cropland base. The world used about 1.4

billion hectares of land for crops in 1961 and only 1.5 billion hectares in 1998 to get twice the amount of grain and oilseeds. Producing today's food supply with 1960 crop yields would probably require at least an additional 300 million hectares of land, an area equal to the entire land mass of Western Europe. At the same time, food prices have declined to the lowest levels in history, to the benefit of consumers who are able to eat better while spending less and less of their budget on food. Although hundreds of millions of people are still food-insecure, this is not related to lack of overall production but more to the location of production and the access to food by countries, households, and individuals living on the edge of subsistence.

McCarl, Bruce A., Richard M. Adams, and Brian H. Hurd. "Global Climate Change and Its Impact on Agriculture," Processed. Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, Feb. 6, 2001, 20 pages. Download from: <http://agecon2.tamu.edu/people/faculty/mccarl-bruce/papers/879.pdf>

The vulnerability of global food supply to climate change raises at least two fundamental problems. First, future food supply may be directly threatened by climate change. Second, food supply capacity may be altered by efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHGE) as society tries to mitigate future implications of climate change. This chapter reviews both sides of the issue, summarizing economic considerations, concerns, and research findings. McCarl et al. highlight the longer run agricultural climate change issue, but they also discuss the shorter run role of agriculture in mitigating GHGE.

Michel, David & Amit Pandya. "Troubled Waters: Climate Change, Hydropolitics, and Transboundary Resources." The Henry L. Stimson Center. 2009. Downloaded from: http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/troubled_waters-complete.pdf

This work examines the environmental dangers and policy dilemmas confronting the sustainable management of shared water resources in a warming world. It presents analyses by regional experts as well as by Stimson staff. The content of this volume draws substantially on a two-day cross-regional workshop co-hosted by Stimson and The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) in Delhi September 5–6, 2008. The workshop focused on the impacts of climate change on major transnational river basins and gathered experts from academia, think tanks, NGOs, public service, and the private sector.

Additional Readings

Ahmed, Akhter U. et.al. “Characteristics and Causes of Severe Poverty and Hunger,” IFPRI 2020. Focus Brief on the World’s Poor and Hungry People, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, Oct. 2007, 4 pages. Download from:

http://conferences.ifpri.org/2020Chinaconference/pdf/beijingbrief_ahmed2.pdf

Bertini, Catherine, and Dan Glickman, Co-chairs. *Renewing American Leadership in the Fight against Global Hunger and Poverty: The Chicago Initiative on Global Agricultural Development*, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Chicago, IL, 2009. Download from:

http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/GlobalAgDevelopment/Report/gadp_final_report.pdf

Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. “Agricultural Development Strategy Overview,” Seattle, Aug. 2011, 10 pages. Download from:

<http://www.gatesfoundation.org/agriculturaldevelopment/Documents/agricultural-developmentstrategy-overview.pdf>

College of Agriculture and Life Sciences. “Agricultural Biotechnology—Informing the Dialogue,” Cornell University, 2002, 28 pages. Download from:

<http://www.nysaes.cals.cornell.edu/gmo/PDF/GMO2002.pdf>

Foresight Project. “Executive Summary,” *The Future of Food and Farming: Challenges and Choices for Global Sustainability*. Final Project Report. London, U.K.: The Government Office for Science, 2011, pp. 9-37. Download from:

<http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/bispartners/foresight/docs/food-and-farming/11-546-future-of-foodand-farming-report>.

Hebebrand, Charlotte. *Leveraging Private Sector Investments in Developing Country Agrifood Systems*. Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2011, 58 pages. Download at:

<http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/GlobalAgDevelopment/Report/CCGA%20GADI%20Private%20Sector%20Policy%20Paper%20FINAL%20VERSION.pdf>.

Ho, Melissa D., and Charles E. Hanrahan. “The Obama Administration’s Feed the Future Initiative,” Report no. R41612, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, Jan. 10, 2011, 21 pages. Download from: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41612.pdf>.

Sanders, Dwight R, and Scott H. Irwin. "Futures Imperfect," New York Times, July 20, 2008.
Download from:

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/opinion/20irwinsanders.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.

Spielman, David J., and Rajul Pandya-Lorch, eds. *Millions Fed: Proven Successes in Agricultural Development – Highlights*. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, 2009, 32 pages. Download from:

http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/millionsfedbooklet_smaller.pdf.

12. *The Future of Force and Faith: World Religions and Global Power*

The shift from agricultural to industrial society has brought about not only a demographic but a spiritual transition. The most advanced nations in the world are increasingly secular. In Europe, rates of church attendance have plummeted to the point where fewer than ten percent of French or Germans attend weekly services; when asked if they believe in God, only 52% of Europeans answer in the affirmative.⁸⁷ Across the Atlantic, over 40% of Americans attend church weekly and 92% profess belief in God.⁸⁸ Even in the United States, however, there are signs of secularization. The number of “religiously unaffiliated” has climbed from 15% in 2007 to just under 20% in 2012.⁸⁹ And since the unaffiliated are disproportionately young, this trend may well continue.⁹⁰

Secularization has profound demographic consequences, because believers across a range of faiths have more children than non-believers. Americans who attend church more than once a week average 2.34 children, while Europeans have 2.74. By contrast, Americans who *never* attend Church have 1.7 children, Europeans 1.79.⁹¹ The same pattern holds *within* religions as well. Among American Jews, the ultra-orthodox average 6.72 children, whereas Reform Jews have 1.36 and secular Jews 1.29.⁹² With a view to these and similar statistics, the sociologist

⁸⁷ For European Church attendance, see Robert Manchin, “Religion in Europe: Trust Not Filling Pews” (Gallup, 21 September 2004), <http://www.gallup.com/poll/13117/religion-europe-trust-filling-pews.aspx>. For European belief in God, see European Commission, “Social Values, Science, and Technology,” Eurobarometer (24 June 2005), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_225_report_en.pdf. Note that there is wide disparity among nations when individuals are asked if they believe in God: over 90% in Cyprus and Malta say yes, far below 20% in Estonia and Czech Republic.

⁸⁸ For US church attendance, see Frank Newport, “Americans’ Church Attendance Inches Up in 2010” (Gallup Wellbeing, 25 June 2010), <http://www.gallup.com/poll/141044/americans-church-attendance-inches-2010.aspx>. Note that this poll gave respondents five possible answers to the question, “How often do you attend church, synagogue, or mosque?” Thirty-five percent said “At least once a week” and eight said “Almost every week.” These two responses are combined in the text (as they are by Gallup under “Frequent church attendance”). The poll cited above regarding European church attendance asked the following question: “Do you attend religious services other than weddings or funerals several times a week, once a week, a few times a year, once a year or less, or never?” The responses “several times a week” and “once a week” were combined to produce the figures cited. See Frank Newport, “More Than 9 in 10 Americans Continue to Believe in God” (Gallup, 3 June 2011), <http://www.gallup.com/poll/147887/Americans-Continue-Believe-God.aspx>.

⁸⁹ Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, “‘Nones’ on the Rise: One in Five Adults Have No Religious Affiliation” (Pew Research Center, 9 October 2012), http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Religious_Affiliation/Unaffiliated/NonesOnTheRise-full.pdf. Also note that even though 92% saying believe in God seems high, this is the lowest number Gallup has received since it began asking in 1944.

⁹⁰ Pew reports that 34% of Americans born between 1990 and 1994 are unaffiliated, as are 30% of those born in the 1980s. The unaffiliated portion of each group declines as age increase, with only 5% of the “greatest generation” (born between 1913 and 1927) describing themselves as unaffiliated. See Pew, “‘Nones’ on the Rise, 2012.

⁹¹ Thomas Frejka and Charles F. Westoff, “Religion, religiousness and fertility in U.S. and in Europe,” *European Journal of Population* 24:1 (2008): 5-31.

⁹² Anthony Gordon and Richard Horowitz provide this data, drawn from the National Jewish Population Survey. See “National Jewish Population Survey 2000-01: Strength, Challenge, and Diversity in the American Jewish Population” (2001), <http://www.jewishfederations.org/page.aspx?id=33650>; and Gordon and Horowitz, “Will Your

Eric Kaufman writes, “In all parts of the world, fundamentalist fertility exceeds moderate religious fertility, which in turn outpaces secular fertility.”⁹³ As a result, Kaufmann claims, “the religious shall inherit the earth.”⁹⁴

The fertility of religious populations may have profound consequences for global politics. In Israel, for instance, the ultra-Orthodox enjoy increasing power in Israel’s democratic elections; what’s more, their demographic expansion has coincided with declines in Palestinian fertility.⁹⁵ The immigration of conservative Russian Jews to Israel over the past two decades has reinforced these changes in Israel’s political complexion. In Europe, the high fertility of Muslim immigrants combined with the low fertility of natives is likely to increase the prominence of European Islam and may strengthen the backlash against immigration; Kaufmann suggests Muslims will make up a fifth of Europe’s population by the end of the century.⁹⁶ Demographic shifts within the overarching Christian community can also spark important political change as younger generations are increasingly drawn to evangelical faiths, forsaking the traditional loyalties of their parents. In Russia, such shifts have fueled a backlash on the part of the established Orthodox Church in concert with the Kremlin. In Latin America, however, the growth of the evangelical movement has led the Catholic Church to advocate economic, political, and social reform as a means to retain “market share.” These developments, combined with the link between demographic growth and religious faith, prevent Western leaders from trusting blithely in the irreversible spread of secularism.

Should U.S. foreign policy reflect these developments in global religion? Much of the “foreign policy” carried out by American society, as distinct from the American state, already reflects these changes. In 2010 alone, the United States sent an estimated 127,000 missionaries abroad.⁹⁷ To what extent does American religion reflect a compelling form of soft power? Does it pose challenges to U.S. policymakers that other forms of soft power do not? If Kaufmann is right that “the religious shall inherit the earth,” how might this influence American foreign policy?

Grandchildren Be Jews?” *SimpleToRemember.com* (accessed May 2013),

<http://www.simpletoremember.com/articles/a/WillYourGrandchildrenBeJews/>.

⁹³ Eric Kaufmann, *Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?* (London: Profile Books, 2010), p. xviii.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

⁹⁵ See David Goldman, “Israel’s Demographic Miracle,” *inFocus Quarterly* 7:1 (Spring 2013),

<http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/4058/israel-demographic-miracle>. Goldman quotes Yasser Arafat saying “The womb of the Palestinian woman is my strongest weapon.”

⁹⁶ For another example of politically charged demographic developments, consider the case of India: The fertility of Muslims in India’s north has increased their share of the Indian electorate – from eight percent in 1947 to fourteen percent today, and (it is projected) 17% by 2050 – a development that may influence India’s relations with Muslim neighbors and may also strengthen the hand of Indian nationalist parties. See Kaufmann, *Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?*, 66.

⁹⁷ On missionaries, see Daniel Lovering, “In 200-Year Tradition, Most Christian Missionaries are American,” *Reuters* (20 February 2012), <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/20/us-missionary-massachusetts-idUSTRE81J0ZD20120220>. And consider Walter Russell Mead, “The Connecticut Yankee in the Court of King Arthur,” chap. 5 in *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001).

Recommended Readings

Baumgartner, Jody C., Peter L. Francia, and Jonathan S. Morris. "A Clash of Civilizations? The Influence of Religion on Public Opinion of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East." *Political Research Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (June 2008): 171-179. Accessed September 8, 2013.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20299723>.

The authors argue that religious beliefs play a significant role in predicting American public opinion on foreign policy issues in the Middle East. Specifically, Evangelical Christians tend to remain staunch supporters of an aggressive foreign policy toward the Middle East. Additionally, the authors find that Evangelicals are among the strongest supporters of Israel and hold more negative views of Islam. These results reinforce the growing importance of the "faith factor" in public opinion and American politics.

Fox, Jonathan. "Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations." *International Studies Review* 3, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 53-73. Accessed September 9, 2013.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186242>.

This article examines why religion is often overlooked by policymakers and academics in international relations. Jonathan Fox then counters the arguments by exploring religion's influence on international politics at all levels of analysis: policymakers and their constituents, government behavior both domestically and internationally, and when religious issues and phenomena become international issues. Fox concludes by acknowledging that while his discussion neatly divides the influence of religion into three distinct categories, reality is more complicated. He also identifies other issues linking religion and politics, such as globalization and environmentalism.

Oldmixon, Elizabeth A., Beth Rosenson, and Kenneth D. Wald. "Conflict over Israel: The Role of Religion, Race, Party and Ideology in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1997-2002."

Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 3 (2005): 407-426. Accessed September 13, 2013.

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546550590929246>.

This paper explores the contours of support for the state of Israel in the House of Representatives from 1997-2002. In an analysis of votes and co-sponsorship decisions, the authors identify new partisan, ideological, religious, and racial cleavages that emerge. Their findings suggest that the development of U.S. foreign policy is heavily marked by domestic ethno-religious forces.

Putnam, Robert D., and David E. Campbell. "Religion in American Politics." Chap. 11 in *American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010.

This chapter looks at the American political landscape in order to examine the connection between religiosity and politics. Putnam and Campbell attempt to answer two questions: What has happened in the nation's politics to drive a wedge between religious and nonreligious voters? And what might the political future hold? They posit that the glue which holds religiosity and partisanship together is the political salience around the issues of abortion and same-sex marriage. As the political parties have moved apart on these issues, religious and nonreligious voters have moved apart also. These shifts are amplified among young people.

Solt, F., Philip Habel, and J. Tobin Grant. "Economic Inequality, Relative Power, and Religiosity." *Social Science Quarterly* 92, no. 2 (June 2011): 447-465. Accessed September 9, 2013. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540.6237.2011.00777.x/pdf>.

The idea that economic inequality fosters faith is the subject of this article. If such a relationship does exist, Solt, et al. also want to know *why* does it exist? Is it that in inegalitarian societies poor people increasingly embrace religion? Or, is there another explanation? If such a relationship does exist, is it because economic inequality promotes religiosity, or because increased religiosity promotes economic inequality? Using survey data from 76 different countries on both the degree of economic inequality and the degree of religiosity, Solt et al. address these and related questions.

Additional Readings

Albright, Madeleine. *The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006. (Chapters 1, 7, 17)

Barber, Benjamin R. "Jihad v. McWorld." *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 1992.

Glendon, Mary Ann. "Universality Under Siege." In *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 221-233. New York: Random House, 2002.

Hehir, J. Bryan. "Religious Freedom and U.S. Foreign Policy: Categories and Choices." In *The Influence of Faith: Religious Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy 2001*, ed. Elliot Abrams, 35-52. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001.

Kaufmann, Eric. *Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?: Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century*. London: Profile Books, 2010.

Mead, Walter R. "The Connecticut Yankee in the Court of King Arthur." In *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World*, 139-162. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001.

Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephan M. Walt. *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007.

Rifkin, Ira. "Islam: God as History." In *Spiritual Perspectives in Globalization: Making Sense of Economic and Cultural Upheaval*, 41-59. Woodstock, VT: Skylight Paths Publishing, 2003.

Sacks, Jonathan. *The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations*. London: Continuum Books, 2002. (Chapters 1-2)

Witte, John. *Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010. Chapters 3, 4, 6, 7 examine the writing and reasoning of the religion clauses of the Constitution.

III. The Demographics of National Security

13. *The Revolution Will Be Tweeted? Accountability, Social Media, and State Power*

Technology spreads by means as amorphous and unintended as religion, and its effect is often every bit as disruptive. In revolutions and protest movements across the Greater Middle East – Iran in 2010, Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, Syria from 2011 to the present – the use of social media to coordinate and publicize collective action has been ubiquitous. In June of 2013, tweeting Turkish protestors led Turkey’s Prime Minister to label social media “the worst menace to society.”⁹⁸

For authoritarian states, this seems to be true. Technology scholar Phillip Howard notes that “there are still no good examples of countries with rapidly growing internet populations and increasingly authoritarian governments.”⁹⁹ Partly with a view to this fact, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton declared the “freedom to connect” a fundamental human right.¹⁰⁰ The liberalizing tendencies of Internet access might be an ephemeral phenomenon, however, since with every “Twitter revolution” the incentives for authoritarian governments to control access to Internet increases. Some nations, such as China, have proven quite adept at erecting firewalls and aggressively prosecuting those who manage to sap them. Also, terrorist networks live on-line alongside human rights groups, making the illiberal and the liberal virtual neighbors.

How can U.S. policymakers promote the Internet as a potential force for democratization and liberalization? Do the risks of on-line extremist organizations and unfiltered information outweigh the benefits of the Internet? What degree of government regulation of the Internet is consistent with civil liberties, and to what degree does the Internet pose civil liberties problems different than those related to print media? Does the proliferation of Internet access in the developing world serve U.S. foreign policy interests? If so, should the United States actively promote ownership of inexpensive personal computers and cheap access to the internet? Or might the tentative, ephemeral relationships the Internet fosters ultimately undermine the strong bonds of civil society and thus weaken democracy?¹⁰¹ What is the difference between a network

⁹⁸ Oray Egin, “Tweeting Turks Sidestep Mainstream Media,” *AlJazeera* (4 June 2013), <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/06/20136482946191873.html>. Erdogan is quoted further: “I believe that Twitter is very dangerous for the peace and democracy process in Turkey. It helps spread many lies and it’s impossible to prevent it. I believe that social media should be regulated according to law.”

⁹⁹ Phillip N. Howard, “Are There Countries Whose Situation Worsened with the Arrival of the Internet,” *Freedom to Tinker* (18 April 2013), <https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/pnhoward/are-there-countries-whose-situations-worsened-with-the-arrival-of-the-internet/>.

¹⁰⁰ Hilary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom” (21 January 2010), <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm>. On a related resolution in the UN Human Rights Council, see Clinton, “Resolution on the Promotion, Protection, and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet” (5 July 2012), <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/07/194610.htm>.

¹⁰¹ Some argue that, the Arab Spring notwithstanding, social media is in fact a poor tool for coordinating collective action. Before putting their lives at risk, these writers argue, individuals must build trust with one another, and trust is generated more readily by personal, face-to-face encounters than by ephemeral links and “likes.” For a summary of this argument, see Malcolm Gladwell, “Small Change – Why the Revolution Will Not be Tweeted,” *The New*

and a community? How can U.S. foreign policymakers maintain social media, mobile phones, and other technologies as “on-ramps to modernity” while protecting sensitive and proprietary information?¹⁰²

Recommended Readings

Fischer, Claude S. “Technology and Community: Historical Complexities.” *Sociological Inquiry* vol. 67, no. 1 Winter 1997: 113-118.

Although it is now somewhat dated, this article is a valuable study of the role new media technologies play in communities. Fischer finds that new technologies have a modest effect on community. Social lives remain the same despite changing technologies – people still interact in a similar manner. Changes to social structure result from other sources, not necessarily those technologies. This article provides an avenue for discussion on whether the Internet changes society or society changes independent of the Internet.

Howard, Philip, and Muzammil Hussain. “The Role of Digital Media.” *Journal of Democracy* 22(3):35-48.

Howard and Hussain discuss democratization and digital media using Tunisia and Egypt as case studies. The authors look at how the wide leadership and quick diffusion of ideas challenged theories of protests. Examining the shift to digital sources of news and communication, this paper shows the role social media played in the spread of ideas of democratization in the Middle East and North Africa.

MacKinnon, Rebecca. *Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom*. New York: Basic Books, 2012.

Consent of the Networked highlights the struggle between Internet access and civil liberties. While the Arab Spring demonstrated the strength of social media in rallying an oppressed populace to overthrow regimes, MacKinnon sees the need to take further steps in access. Understanding how the Internet empowers, this book looks at governing the empowerment to ensure that Internet freedom continues without global corporations and powerful government control.

Yorker (4 October 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell. Advocates of democratization might be mistaken to put too much faith in the power of the Internet, Gladwell suggests, as it tends to distract them from the real work that needs (still) to be done.

¹⁰² For the phrase “on-ramps to modernity,” see Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom” (21 January 2010), <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm>.

Schmidt, Eric, and Jared Cohen. *The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People, Nations and Business*. New York: Knopf, 2013.

The New Digital Age looks to the future of the connected world. Covering all levels of association, from the individual to global governance, Schmidt and Cohen address the global growth of digital technology and access. This book looks at how previously disconnected individuals gain access to global markets and can connect in virtual states. Schmidt and Cohenit also investigate less positive developments, like government surveillance and other potential pitfalls of a hyper-connected world.

Wichowski, Alexis. "Social Diplomacy or How Diplomats Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Tweet." *Foreign Affairs*, 5 Apr. 2013. Accessed 15 Sept. 2013.
<<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139134/alexis-wichowski/social-diplomacy>>.

Use of social media by governments is rarely timely. Getting ahead of a story or ensuring populations are aware of ongoing efforts takes work and requires leadership; it is also risky, as states must relinquish some control in order to provide access to social media forums. This article explores the role of diplomatic use of social media in recent incidents. As the implementers of foreign policy, diplomats must understand how to influence the populations with whom they interact. Spoken dialogue and written letters worked in the past. Today, social media speeds up a long process and requires agile thinkers to properly convey messages.

Additional Readings

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http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell.

Gladwell, Malcolm and Clay Shirky. "From Innovation to Revolution." *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2011.

Goldsmith, Jack and Tim Wu. *Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World*. New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2008.

Lanier, Jaron. "Digital Maoism: The Hazards of the New Online Collectivism." *Edge*. May 29, 2006. Accessed September 15, 2013. <http://www.edge.org/conversation/digital-maoism-the-hazards-of-the-new-online-collectivism>.

Morozov, Evgeny. *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2012.

Schlozman, Kay, Verba, Sidney, and Henry Brady. "The Weapon of the Strong? Participatory Inequality and the Internet Revolution." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, Chicago, Illinois. April 2, 2009. Accessed September 15, 2013. http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p361714_index.html.

Shirky, Clay. "The Political Power of Social Media." *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2011, Vol. 90, Issue 1.

Thompson, Clive. "Brave New World of Digital Intimacy." *The New York Times*, September 7, 2008. Accessed September 15, 2013.

[http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/magazine/07awareness-t.html?_r=2&sq=clive thompson&st=cse&oref=slogin&scp=1&pagewanted=all](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/magazine/07awareness-t.html?_r=2&sq=clive%20thompson&st=cse&oref=slogin&scp=1&pagewanted=all).

Wu, Irene. "Network Communities From Telegraph to the Internet: Using Information as Capital and Ammunition." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, California, April 2012.

Zittrain, Jonathan. *The Future of the Internet—And How to Stop It*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.

14. TMI? Privacy and the Promise of “Big Data”

The sheer volume of the globe’s digital information – everything, whether pictures on Facebook or bank transactions, that resides somewhere as ones and zeroes – has grown exponentially over the past several decades. The International Data Corporation estimates that the amount of digital information generated annually has increased nine fold in the last five years alone.¹⁰³ In 2007, the volume of digital data generated surpassed the world’s digital storing capacity, and the gap between the two is projected to expand for the foreseeable future.¹⁰⁴ In short, the world now has more digital information than it can store and far more than it can easily comprehend. This overabundance of information has come to be known as “big data.”¹⁰⁵

For businessmen, government administrators, and scholars, the prospect of near-limitless information is alluring. Businesses see in “big data” the potential to increase productivity by managing personnel more effectively and targeting consumers more directly.¹⁰⁶ Government administrators see an opportunity to make programs more efficient and thus “do more with less” – a particularly inviting prospect as budgets decrease.¹⁰⁷ Scholars, for their part, welcome an unprecedented expansion of our knowledge about human behavior, one which can reshape a number of academic disciplines – including demography. Never before have scholars been able to measure populations in the same breadth and depth as they can now.

Information is not identical to intelligence, however, and what we learn from expansive data sets is determined as much by the questions we ask and the answers we accept as the data themselves.¹⁰⁸ Simply learning how to learn from “big data” is a significant challenge. Limiting who can learn what is challenging as well. Leaks of secret information – from the first major Wikileaks releases in 2010 to the 2013 exposure of National Security Agency surveillance activities in the United States and abroad – have represented triumphs of transparency to their promoters and threats to national security to their detractors.

¹⁰³ John Gantz and David Reinsel, “Extracting Value From Chaos,” *IDC iView* (June 2011), <http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/idc-extracting-value-from-chaos-ar.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴ “Data, Data Everywhere,” *The Economist* (25 February 2010), <http://www.economist.com/node/15557443>.

¹⁰⁵ For discussion of the meaning of “big data” – “datasets whose size is beyond the ability of typical database software tools to capture, store, manage, and analyze” – see James Manyika et al., *Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and Productivity* (McKinsey Global Institute, June 2011), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation.

¹⁰⁶ See “The Transformative Potential of Big Data in Five Domains,” chap. 3 in Manyika et al., *Big Data*, June 2011.

¹⁰⁷ In March of 2012 the Obama Administration announced a \$200 million “Big Data Research and Development Initiative.” See, for instance, Nancy Scola, “Obama, the ‘Big Data’ President,” *Washington Post* (14 June 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-14/opinions/39967818_1_big-data-data-show-internet-data. The use of big data in development policy has also received significant attention. See Emmanuel Letouzé, *Big Data for Development: Challenges and Opportunities* (New York: UN Global Pulse, May 2012), <http://www.unglobalpulse.org/projects/BigDataforDevelopment>, and World Economic Forum, *Big Data, Big Impact: New Possibilities for International Development* (2012), <http://www.weforum.org/reports/big-data-big-impact-new-possibilities-international-development>.

¹⁰⁸ See Shvetank Shah, Andrew Horne, and Jaime Capellá, “Good Data Won’t Guarantee Good Decisions,” *Harvard Business Review* (April 2012), <http://hbr.org/2012/04/good-data-wont-guarantee-good-decisions/ar/1>.

Increasing military attention to cyberspace, which was placed alongside land, water, and air as an “operational domain” in 2011, has reflected growing national vulnerability to on-line attacks.¹⁰⁹ Cyberspace has now become essential to the functioning of modern societies as a place where essential services are delivered, wealth is made and stored, and important national security functions occur. In all of these ways, the accelerating movement of information into the digital realm and the increasing exposure of digital information via shared networks have given rise to unprecedented risks.

How can U.S. policymakers manage these risks? What can government policy do to facilitate the exploitation of “big data’s” seemingly vast potential? How should this potential be balanced against concerns over privacy and collection of personal information? How can government gather and analyze data to increase its own efficiency?

Recommended Readings

Bamford, James. “The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch What You Say).” *Wired*, 15 March 2012. Available on-line: http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/all/1.

As individuals are increasingly exposed on-line, their relation to friends, businesses, and community groups has changed – often for the better. Do citizens relate to their government differently than before? If so, does this change represent an improvement or a deterioration? The rise in prominence of global terrorism, combined with expansion of available information, has led many policymakers to test norms and laws regarding “unreasonable searches and seizures.” What, they ask, is “unreasonable” when surveillance of Internet and cell phone traffic can prevent mass casualty terrorist attacks? In this article, journalist James Bamford explores one episode in this ongoing debate: the National Security Agency’s construction of the “Utah Data Center,” a listening post of sorts, located in a silent, anonymous desert.

The Economist. “Data Data Everywhere.” *The Economist*, 25 February 2010. Available on-line: www.economist.com/node/15557443.

This *Economist* editorial introduces the reader to the challenges and opportunities of access to vast amounts of information – too vast, in fact, for conventional modes of storage and analysis. “Managed well,” the authors argue, “data can be used to unlock new sources of economic value, provide fresh insights into science, and hold

¹⁰⁹ For a dramatic introduction to the challenge of cyber security, see the journalism of Michael Joseph Gross in *Vanity Fair*: “Silent War” (6 June 2013), <http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2013/07/new-cyberwar-victims-american-business>; “Enter the Cyber-dragon,” *Vanity Fair* (September 2011), <http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/09/chinese-hacking-201109>.

governments to account.” But more data can also give rise to more problems. To exploit big data, for instance, one must separate the wheat from the chaff, the melody from the noise. But as analytical tools increase in power, so too does the sheer volume of data to be analyzed. There is also the matter of privacy. “Big data” represents information about real human beings – everything from their baby pictures bank accounts – and these individuals might rightly worry that as their personal data grows their personal privacy shrinks.

Manyika, James, et al. “Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and Productivity.” McKinsey Global Institute, May 2011. Available on-line: http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation.

If one must be informed about a problem in order to solve it, the recent surge in “data” ought to empower problem solvers of all stripes. Economic (and not only economic) efficiency should increase in proportion to the increase in data. But how exactly does this process work, and what segments of the economy are most effected? This McKinsey report examines the use of “big data” in five distinct areas: U.S. healthcare, U.S. retail, the European public sector, global personal location services, and global manufacturing. In each case, the authors suggest, harnessing “big data” has produced significant gains in efficiency. It does so by increasing the knowledge available to consumers of goods and services, and by allowing firms to monitor their employees and inventories more precisely, target potential customers more directly, and make informed decisions more rapidly. “Big data” also has the potential to increase rates of innovation. While the authors acknowledge potential difficulties, they argue nevertheless that the overall effect of the rise of “big data” will be positive: increased productivity and economic growth.

Mayer-Schönberger, Viktor, and Kenneth Cukier, *Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013.

The Centers for Disease Control has difficulty predicting how flu will spread across a population, but Google, armed with information on which regions search for “flu medicine” and when, does not. With this anecdote, Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier begin their popular introduction to the phenomenon of “big data.” The ability to process vast amounts of information, they suggest, produces insights comparable – often superior to – those available to specialists working alone. As our data set expands our uncertainty diminishes. But mustn’t we know how to use this data, and shouldn’t we worry about our personal identities evaporating into an array of publicly-accessible bits and bytes? Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier are ultimately optimistic. There are few problems that more data can’t solve.

Shvetank, Shah, et al. “Good Data Won’t Guarantee Good Decisions.” *Harvard Business Review* (April 2012). Available on-line: <http://hbr.org/2012/04/good-data-wont-guarantee-good-decisions/ar/1>.

Sadly, information does not interpret itself. Even the most complex analytical software programs present their results to human beings, who must decide what to do on the basis of the information in front of them. As a result, “big data” has heightened the sensitivity of businessmen to distinctions previously of interest only to epistemologists: awareness is not knowledge, knowledge is not judgment, and judgment is not prudence. “Big data” itself, in short, creates as much confusion as clarity; to use it well demands intellectual virtues that data, no matter how “big,” cannot produce. Shah et al. elaborate these and other insights of the “big data” skeptics. In the face of (apparent) omniscience, how can we correct for humanity’s stubborn fallibility?

Additional Readings

Cull, Bill. “3 Ways Big Data is Transforming Government.” *FCW* (25 September 2013). Available on-line: <http://fcw.com/articles/2013/09/25/big-data-transform-government.aspx>.

Jacobs, Adam. “The Pathologies of Big Data.” *Communication of the ACM* 52:8 (August 2009): 36-44. Available on-line: http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/1540000/1536632/p36-jacobs.pdf?ip=134.240.202.6&id=1536632&acc=OPEN&key=F9B7F4BB951339C12170E67C436BC282F284CBBD06ADF37650B076DB19D51103&CFID=253255852&CFTOKEN=27292766&acm_ =1381571645_521ac50bfc9ba6f4bf73a53c3630775c.

Lewis, Michael. *Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003.

Lohr, Steve. “The Age of Big Data.” *New York Times* (11 February 2012).

McAfee, Andrew and Erik Brynjolfsson. “Big Data: The Management Revolution.” *Harvard Business Review* (October 2012). Available on-line: <http://hbr.org/2012/10/big-data-the-management-revolution>.

Siegel, Eric. *Predictive Analytics: The Power to Predict Who Will Click, Buy, Lie, or Die*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2013.

Silver, Nate. *The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail – but Some Don’t*. New York: Penguin Press, 2012.

15. From Mil to Civ: The Downsizing of the U.S. Military and the Fate of Civil-Military Relations

The appeal of “soft power” as a tool of democratization has risen as the appeal of “hard power” has waned. After a decade of war, America’s military operations in Iraq have come to an end and operations in Afghanistan are winding down. As both nations’ regimes are only tenuously democratic and the extent of future U.S. influence in both seems uncertain at best, many policymakers have drawn a simple lesson from the past decade of war: “never again.” Americans seem to agree. In March of 2013 53% of American said the Iraq war was a mistake, while 44% said Afghanistan was a mistake, the highest rate recorded.¹¹⁰

The legacy of these wars is not simply a matter of strategic “lessons learned,” however. As the U.S. military downsizes, it faces the challenge of reintegrating veterans into civilian life – a challenge that is, in many ways, more vexing now than ever before. The wars fought over the last decade were the first extended engagements since Vietnam and the first to be fought with an All-Volunteer Force. As a result, 99% of the American population did not serve. When soldiers came home from Vietnam, many returned to curses and worse, but they nevertheless re-entered a society with first-hand experience of military service.¹¹¹ A soldier leaving the military in 1969 entered a population of whom thirteen percent were veterans, including more than one in four males, while a soldier leaving military service in 2011 returned to a nation in which seven percent of the population served.¹¹² Also, as soldiers returned from Iraq and Afghanistan American society had largely lost interest in the wars they fought. In 2010, according to one study, four percent of news coverage was devoted to Afghanistan and one percent to Iraq.¹¹³ As a result of all of these factors, reintegrating veterans into American society has proven difficult. Unemployment rates have been higher among veterans than among non-veterans, and suicides

¹¹⁰ Andrew Dugan, “On 10th Anniversary, 53% in U.S. See Iraq War as Mistake,” Gallup Politics (18 March 2013), <http://www.gallup.com/poll/161399/10th-anniversary-iraq-war-mistake.aspx>. On Afghanistan, note that a majority (51%) still thought it was not a mistake. For data on U.S. public opinion on Afghanistan, see “Afghanistan,” Gallup (accessed July 2013), <http://www.gallup.com/poll/116233/Afghanistan.aspx>.

¹¹¹ For a collection of stories of soldiers’ troubled homecomings from Vietnam, see Bob Greene, *Homecoming: When the Soldiers Returned from Vietnam* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1989).

¹¹² Data on Vietnam-era veterans is drawn from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1970* (91st edition) (Washington, DC: 1970), Item No. 402, p. 265, http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html. Data on present day veterans is drawn from U.S. Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2011* (Washington, DC: 2011), Table 519, p. 340, <http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/>.

¹¹³ On news coverage of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, see “Press Coverage and Public Interest: Matches and Mismatches,” Pew Research (11 January 2011), <http://www.people-press.org/2011/01/11/press-coverage-and-public-interest-matches-and-mismatches/>; and John Hanrahan, “The War Without End is a War with Hardly Any News Coverage,” *Nieman Watchdog* (10 August 2011), <http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=background.view&backgroundid=569>. For an editorial on the topic of American apathy towards Iraq and Afghanistan, see Albert R. Hunt, “Veterans Need Care, Not Apathy,” *New York Times* (30 May 2010), <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/31/us/31iht-letter.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>.

among veterans have drawn national attention.¹¹⁴ A decade of war had widened the civil-military gap to the point where few civilians were aware that there was such a gap.

Is this divergence between civilian and soldier a problem, or merely a symptom of the U.S. military's (admirable?) professionalization as an All-Volunteer Force? What steps, if any, should be taken to reduce the significant physical and psychological separation of the armed forces from American society? Many have argued that without "skin in the game" – through military service or through taxes – it is too easy for the American electorate to remain unengaged in the country's use-of-force decisions and their consequences. Has the advent of the All-Volunteer Force reduced the accountability of American foreign policy? Social scientists have noted the erosion in the United States of a coherent national identity over the past few decades.¹¹⁵ Is the symbolic power of the armed forces fading, particularly among America's youth, and if so, is this phenomenon accelerating the decay of a sense of American unity and purpose? As the All-Volunteer Force, instituted in 1973, turns forty this year, what aspects of it are in need of reform? How can U.S. policymakers facilitate the reintegration of veterans into civilian life? To what degree should veterans affairs and the legacy costs of war be factored into force structure and future use of force decisions? Will the waning wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the Great Recession, shift U.S. strategy towards a greater reliance on inter-state alliances and instruments of "soft power," with an attendant increase in the influence of U.S. diplomats and NGOs?

Recommended Readings

A National Veterans Strategy: The economic, social, and security imperative. 2012. Syracuse, NY: Institute for Veterans and Military Families.

This paper, published by the Institute for Veterans and Military Families at Syracuse University, aims to promote meaningful and substantive discourse about national policies affecting veterans. Specifically, the paper begins from the premise that there is a social contract that informs and motivates U.S. behavior toward its veterans, and that the behavior of the government and society should be guided by a national strategy. This paper then proposes a national strategy encompassing a number of recommendations for a whole-of-government approach to veterans policy.

¹¹⁴ For data on veteran unemployment see Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employment Situation of Veterans Summary" (20 March 2013), <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/vet.nr0.htm>. In 2011, 12.1% of veterans on active duty during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars were unemployed, as compared to 8.9% of the population; in 2012, 9.9 percent were unemployed, versus 8.1% of the population. On veteran suicide, see Janet Kemp and Robert Bossarte, "Suicide Data Report, 2012," Department of Veterans Affairs (2012), <http://www.va.gov/opa/docs/Suicide-Data-Report-2012-final.pdf>.

¹¹⁵ For a controversial but forceful version of the argument, see Samuel Huntington, *Who Are We?* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

“Army Career and Alumni Program Assessment Report.” 2010. Washington, DC: United States Army.

This paper, an internal Army document compiled by a team of researchers at West Point for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, provides a “deep-dive” look into one program for transitioning soldiers, the Army Career and Alumni Program. Although some of the recommendations are program-specific, the framework for reintegration of veterans is discussed, particularly in section III. Metrics for success are given in chapter IV.

Berglass, Nancy, and Margaret C. Harrell. 2012. *Well after Service: Veteran reintegration and American communities*. Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security.

This excellent report by CNAS describes the general approach to measuring veterans’ wellness. Specifically, measurement of wellness must include purpose, material needs, health, and social relationships (p. 16). Understanding the complex needs of veterans is critical, and this report does a good job of exposing some of the flawed thinking that has characterized much of the policy environment around veterans for generations.

Gade, Daniel M. 2013. “A Better Way to Help Veterans.” *National Affairs*. Summer 2013 (16): 53.

This article addresses some of the problems with the current approach to veterans, specifically exposing the flaws in the definitions of disability that can cause loss of work ability and effort in the population of veterans. It argues for a new definition of disability as it relates to veterans in order to focus benefits where they are needed rather than where they have been flowing in recent decades: to those with minor conditions rather than true disabilities.

———. 2011. “Veterans and Service-connected Disability Status in the Department of Veterans Affairs: Representative bureaucracy at work?” PhD. dissertation, University of Georgia.

Chapters two and three of this dissertation provide background on the culture of the veterans’ community as well as background on the disability claims process.

Heaton, Paul, David S. Loughran, and Amalia R. Miller. 2012. *Compensating Wounded Warriors: An analysis of injury, labor market earnings, and disability compensation among veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars*. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation.

This paper provides detailed data on the economic situation of veterans who became wounded, ill, or injured in combat or during deployment.

Meyer, Thomas. 2013. "Serving Those Who Served: A wise giver's guide to assisting veterans and military families. Washington, DC: The Philanthropy Roundtable.

While crafted for a philanthropic audience, this excellent book provides a good statistical summary of the veterans situation in America, as well as a number of examples of helpful institutions and organizations.

"War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era." 2011. Washington, DC: Pew Social and Demographic Trends.

This comprehensive survey and its results may be used for better understanding the roots of the civil-military gap as it applies to post 9/11 Veterans.

Additional Readings

Borus, Jonathan. 1975. "The Reentry Transition of the Vietnam Veteran." *Armed Forces and Society* November 1975 (2:1): 97-114.

Buddin, Richard, and Kanika Kapur. 2005. *An Analysis of Military Disability Compensation*. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation.

Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Employment Situation of Veterans – 2012." News Release. 20 March 2013.

Heaton, Paul, David S. Loughran, and Amalia R. Miller. 2012. *Compensating Wounded Warriors: An Analysis of Injury, Labor Market Earnings, and Disability Compensation Among Veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars*. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation.

Loughran, David S., and Jacob Alex Klerman. 2008. *Explaining the Increase in Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers During the Global War on Terror*. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation.

Krull, Heather, and Matthew Tyler Haugseth. 2012. *Health and Economic Outcomes in the Alumni of the Wounded Warrior Project*. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation.

Conclusion

Demography represents not only a body of theories and facts but a mode of thought. Like other social sciences, demography tallies individual cases, discerns trends, and projects these trends onto the future. But the object of the demographer's study stretches beyond the bounds of many other social sciences. Populations evolve glacially and in a manner that often seems to elude human control. As a result, demography has a conservative bent that stands in fruitful tension with its otherwise quantitative and rationalizing character. Concerned with birth and death, the existential limits of human life, demography describes the border between sociology and philosophy.

The demographer knows how recently humans were intimately familiar with death. Well into the nineteenth century infant mortality was high by today's standards; essential resources were often scarce, life expectancy low. In the first half of the twentieth century, however, global life expectancy shot from thirty to forty-six; in 2010 it stood at sixty-nine. Within the span of a single human life, life's duration for all humans had more than doubled. During the same period, infant mortality plummeted – by 69% in the latter half of the twentieth century alone. Limits on human health and productivity had been extended to the point where nature itself seemed subdued if not yet (as Bacon had it) conquered. The demographer contemplating the great divide between our own epoch and those preceding it discovers, as it were, two humanities – one considerably freer and more powerful than the other. The discipline of demography might accordingly seem a redemption song.

But this impression may prove illusory, for two reasons. First, this view of demography draws too bright a line between the present and the past. Prior to the industrial revolution there may have been little *global* change in variables of interest to contemporary demographers, but there was variation among regions and regimes.¹¹⁶ As a result, a range of theorists, many perhaps more insightful even than Malthus, considered how humans might seek personal immortality or divine favor through their children, and why certain forms of political life sustain themselves more easily than others.¹¹⁷ Aristotle attributed Sparta's fall partly to its manpower shortage; Polybius credited the Roman republic's expansive foreign conquests partly to its expansive population; Augustus worried that Romans' reluctance to have children under the empire imperiled the regime's longevity.¹¹⁸ When Machiavelli urged readers of his *Discourses*

¹¹⁶ For an account of the broad demographic uniformity before the industrial revolution, see Clark, *A Farewell to Alms*, especially chap. 1, "Introduction: The Sixteen-Page Economic History of the World."

¹¹⁷ For the desire for children as pursuit of personal immortality, see Plato, *Symposium*, 207c-209e; for childbirth as obedience to divine law, consider Genesis 1:28.

¹¹⁸ Aristotle, *Politics*, 2.1270a29-34; Polybius, *The Histories*, 1.64.1-2, 36.17. For Augustus's "moral legislation," see Tacitus, *Annals*, trans. John Jackson (London: William Heinmann, 1931), p. 563 (3.25): The *Lex Papia Poppaea* "had been passed by Augustus in his later years, in order to sharpen the penalties of celibacy and to increase the resources of the exchequer. It failed, however, to make marriage and the family proper – childlessness remained the vogue." Also see Richard Frank, "Augustus' Legislation on Marriage and Children," *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 8 (1975): 41-52.

to imitate the generosity (relative to Sparta, at least) of Rome's immigration policy, and Rousseau claimed that "all other things equal, the government under which the citizens... populate and multiply, is without fail the best," they adapted ancient insights to modern politics.¹¹⁹ Precisely because these earlier modes of demography preceded the industrial revolution and employed methods distinct from those of contemporary sociology, they help us to distinguish from more ephemeral matters the permanent problems of populations and politics.

That there are such permanent problems is the second reason we might doubt progressive views of demography. Some demographic challenges solve themselves. To those anxious over the aging of the American population, for instance, a philosophical demographer might observe that someday baby boomers too shall pass. But not all demographic problems are so easily solved. Though Hobbes may have been right that the individual's desire to preserve life is a passion to be reckoned on, his insight does not apply as neatly to groups of individuals. Linguists predict that nearly half the world's languages will fall out of use over the course of the twenty-first century, a staggering rate of cultural loss in the face of which conventional modes of political analysis fall mute.¹²⁰ If the attempt to eradicate an ethnicity by slaughter is a genocide, what is the slow-motion self-eradication of a culture? And how does cultural self-eradication relate to the national decline brought on by falling fertility? As we have seen, deaths exceeded births in Russia for much of the past decade, but this might plausibly be attributed to the passing trauma of regime change. In Japan, deaths first surpassed births in 2006 and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.¹²¹ The UN projects that there will be 42.8 million fewer Japanese in 2100 than there are today – and this figure assumes that Japanese fertility will slowly ascend towards the replacement rate.¹²² Is this a sound assumption? Might nations resist their own mortality – by "natural causes," at least – less strenuously than individuals do?

¹¹⁹ Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 20-3 (1.6). Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 105 (3.9). The passage from Rousseau is worth quoting in full, as it touches upon the relationship between political philosophy and quantitative social science: "All other things equal, the government under which the citizens, without resort to external means, without naturalizations, without colonies, populate and multiply, is without fail the best: that under which a people dwindles and wastes away is the worst. Calculators, it is now up to you: count, measure, compare."

¹²⁰ For a review of current thought on endangered languages, see John Noble Wilford, "World's Language Dying Off Rapidly," *New York Times* (18 September 2007), <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/18/world/18cnd-language.html>. National Geographic maintains a valuable website devoted to this theme. See "Disappearing Languages: Enduring Voices – Documenting the Planet's Endangered Languages" (accessed July 2013), <http://travel.nationalgeographic.com/travel/enduring-voices/>.

¹²¹ On Japanese depopulation, see Nicholas Eberstadt, "Japan Shrinks," *Wilson Quarterly* (Spring 2012): 30-7, http://www.wilsonquarterly.com/sites/default/files/articles/Feat_Eberstadt.FNL.pdf; "The Old and the Older: Japan is Ageing Faster Than Any Country in History," *The Economist* (19 November 2010), http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2010/11/japans_population; Ross Douthat, "Incredible Shrinking Country," *New York Times* (28 April 2012), <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/opinion/sunday/douthat-incredible-shrinking-country.html?emc=tnt&tntemail1=y&r=1&>.

¹²² In 2010 Japan's population was 127.4 million. The UN predicts it will fall to 84.5 million under its "medium fertility" scenario, which has Japanese fertility climbing from 1.34 (2005-2010) to 1.85 by 2100. Under the "low fertility" scenario, Japan's population would fall to 50.9 million by 2100.

The philosophical demographer knows that nations and civilizations do not always die with a bang. As individuals rise from childhood to vigorous self-sufficiency before declining into “second childishness,” so do nations rise, decline, and fall. Which nations decline and how rapidly depends in no small part on how well their leaders anticipate and respond to the strong tides of demography. Delegates of SCUSA 65 are asked to assume the roles and responsibilities of these leaders and to navigate the United States through its own and the world’s demographic flows.